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2Abstract
The thesis deals with the question of whether causation can play a (relevant) 
part in the explanation of action; it approaches it through the critical assessment of 
two paradigmatic theories of action, one of each side of the debate. In the first part 
D.Davidson’s Causal Theory of Action is presented (as a development of the 
Causal Nomological Theory), and criticised on the grounds that it cannot provide 
adequate singular causal explanations of actions. The argument questions 
Davidson’s model by challenging the way in which Davidson could justify the 
causal relevance of reasons. It concludes that the causal condition adds no 
additional explanatory force on non-causal rationalisations. In the second part, the 
nature of action explanations is examined through von Wright’s non-causal 
approach. After presentation of his theory, his version of the Logical Connection 
Argument is considered in the light of various criticisms that have been directed 
against it. Although his argument is found to be inconclusive with respect to the 
impossibility of a Causal Theory of Action, it is argued that, the implications that 
follow from von Wright’s discussion of it, render the causal claim irrelevant to the 
explanation of action. Finally von Wright’s possible response to two types of 
criticism, is considered: The justification Vs explanation argument and the problem 
of congruence. The conclusion is that his theory deals in a satisfactory way with the 
first one, but fails to meet the challenge of the second one.
To Christina, my first teacher
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5Preface
In this thesis, the question of the role of causes in the explanation of human 
action, is dealt with, through the examination of the views of two philosophers 
which take opposite sides on the debate. D. Davidson’s theory of action is initially 
presented as a natural development of the Causal Theory in its original 
Nomological form, but, as I will try to show in the subsequent discussion, 
Davidson cannot sustain all of his central claims in the Philosophy of Psychology, 
without making any concessions. My inclination is to question the relevance of 
causation in the explanation of action, rather than Davidson’s views on the 
impossibility of formulating strict laws in psychological terms, and so, in the 
second part, I present and assess von Wright’s intentionalist approach, which is 
probably the most comprehensive and influential non-causal theory.
The juxtaposition and assessment of the two theories, is not meant to provide a 
final answer to the central question that I consider. I am sure that a lot more can be 
said in defence of, or against either theory. My aim is rather to show how 
consideration of the arguments presented by the two philosophers can provide 
some ground to question the relevance of causation in the explanation of action. 
These considerations are not decisive since, as I will argue in the second part, no 
version of the Logical Connection Argument can be conclusive and, furthermore, 
von Wright’s theory faces some serious problems of its own.
As will become apparent from the discussion, I do not think that everything 
which is of importance to my central question can be said within the context of 
these two theories. However, I have decided to concentrate mainly on them, not 
only because of their completeness and their decisive influence in the development 
of the main themes in the Philosophy of Action, but also for the purpose of keeping 
a fixed frame within which my main concern can be addressed. There is certainly a 
multitude of interesting views that are left out and which may be helpful in dealing 
with the problem I am addressing; hence, the role of causation in the explanation of 
actions must remain an open issue for me.
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7PART I: THE CAUSAL APPROACH
8CHAPTER 1: THE CAUSAL-NOMOLOGICAL THEORY OF ACTION
Statement o f  the Theory
The Causal Theory of Action is a theory that construes explanation of behaviour 
as a special kind of causal explanation, not differing in principle from explanation 
in the Natural Sciences. This claim is meant to counter a quite widespread and 
persistent view, which holds that the explanation of human action in terms of 
purpose is of a fundamentally different kind, conforming to the model of 
teleological explanation and not admitting the use of the concept of efficient 
causation. To explain a particular action X, is according to this view, to state the 
agent’s goal, Y, say, and his belief that by doing X he would bring about Y.
C.J. Ducasse, one of the first modem proponents of the causal theory, argued1 
that such explanations could, and should be construed in causal terms. The desire 
of the agent that Y shall occur and his belief that by doing X he will bring about Y, 
can be thought of as joint causes of the agent’s behaviour in doing X, in the same 
sense of the word ‘cause’ as that used in any scientific causal explanation. 
According to Ducasse, this kind of explanation ‘essentially consists in the offering 
of a hypothesis of fact, standing to the fact to be explained as case of antecedent to 
case of subsequent of some already known law of connection ‘2. Hence, the central 
idea of the Causal Theory of Action in this form, is that the explanation of action 
consists in stating a causal law (‘laws of bare conjunction statistically obtained, 
will not do’ ), and a set of particular facts (the agent’s desires and beliefs and the 
relevant conditions obtaining), from which the behaviour to be explained follows 
as a consequence.
1 In Ducasse, [1925].
2 Ibid. p. 151.
3 Ibid. p. 151.
9This idea found its most natural and elaborate expression in Hempel’s model of 
Deductive-Nomological explanation. Hempel developed his model for explanation 
by nomic subsumption in a systematic and precise way, claiming for it the status of 
an ideal standard for all complete, scientific explanations. In particular, he argued 
that the logic of action-explanations does not differ from that of any other genuine, 
(as opposed to ‘pseudo’) scientific explanation and he offered a model, in 
accordance with the D-N, which took into account the peculiarities characteristic of 
action-explanations. Although he did not place emphasis on the idea of causation 
as the explanatory relation between reasons and actions, since he considered it of 
secondary importance to that of lawful connection, he certainly allowed and 
accounted for it in terms of causal laws. Therefore, it is right to say, that the 
Causal-Nomological Theory is best developed as a theory that construes action- 
explanations in accordance with Hempel’s covering-law model.
According to Hempel, a complete explanation of an event of kind E, consists of:
‘(1) a  set o f  statements asserting the occurrence o f  certain events C l  Cn at
certain times and places,
(2) a  set o f  universal hypotheses, such that
(a) the statements o f  both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical 
evidence
(b) from the two groups o f  statements the sentence asserting the occurrence 
o f  event E can be logically deduced.’4
It should be noted that the explanandum is a statement asserting the occurrence 
of a concrete event of a specified kind (E). It is not claimed that such an 
explanation is complete in the sense that it accounts for all properties that the 
concrete event, e say, possesses; the occurrence of e cannot be explained without 
reference to any of its characteristics. It follows that the deduction of the 
explanandum from the explanans is possible, only if the laws featured in the latter 
make explicit mention of the property by which the concrete event e, which 
features in the explanandum, is picked out, i.e. its property of being of kind E.
Action-explanations in terms of motivating reasons, besides the usual features 
of all D-N explanations, have the special characteristic that they are connected with 
the normative idea of rationality. For Hempel, to give an action-explanation in
10
terms of reasons, involves commitment to two claims: First that the action was 
motivated by these reasons (which is an empirical hypothesis) and, second, that the 
action explained is appraised as being the appropriate, or reasonable thing to do, 
given the agent’s reasons and the particular circumstances obtaining (which is a 
critical, or normative appraisal). These conditions are satisfied by a D-N action 
explanation, in view of the inclusion in the premises of the D-N argument of a 
general law, which states that all rational agents act in a specified way under a 
certain set of circumstances, and of a statement of particular fact to the effect that 
the agent under consideration was (at the time of the action) a rational agent. Of 
course a further premise, stating that the conditions specified in the antecedent of 
the general law were holding at the relevant time, is needed for the deduction of the 
explanandum to be possible. Accordingly, Hempel construes his D-N model for 
action explanations as follows:
‘A was in situation o f  type C
A was a rational agent
In a situation o f  type C. any rational agent will do x
.Therefore, A did x ’5.
The first premise, which specifies the agent’s condition before the action, will 
include ascriptions of beliefs, desires and other attitudes that may be influential to 
the agent, as well as all the relevant to the performance of the action facts. 
Together with the second premise, they represent the singular statements of fact 
that are necessary for every covering-law explanation to be deductive. The third 
premise is not, according to Hempel, a mere ‘principle of action’ which expresses 
only the appropriateness of actions of type x in circumstances of type C, but an 
empirical law6 stating, in broadly dispositional terms, how rational agents with the 
kind of beliefs and desires specified in the first premise behave. As an empirical
4 Hempel [1942], p.232.
5 In Hempel, [1965], p.471.
6 Hempel produces an analysis of dispositional properties in terms of their various symptoms 
(or manifestations) in different circumstances, in defence of his thesis that such laws are empirical, 
rather than merely analytic (see e.g. Hempel [1965], pp.457-63).
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law, it performs the main explanatory function among the explanantia: It tells us 
why, given that the first two premises were true at the time of action, the agent did, 
in fact, do x. If we knew the initial conditions and the general law before the 
action, we could have predicted with certainty that the agent would do x. If no such 
law was given among the explanantia, then the deduction from the premises to the 
conclusion would not go through, and thus we would have no reason, given the 
initial conditions, to expect that the agent would perform the action.
Hempel, with his D-N model, purports to provide a reconstruction of action- 
explanations that makes their logical structure, and thus their explanatory features, 
transparent. In actual scientific practice (in History and the Social Sciences) such 
complete explanations are seldom, if ever, given. The explanations that are actually 
given are just explanation-sketches in the sense that they are either elliptical, or 
partial (or both). Elliptical explanations do not make explicit mention of the 
general laws or of some of the particular facts involved in the explanation but, if 
they are to be considered genuinely explanatory, they must be thought of as tacitly 
assuming the missing premise(s) of the argument. In this case, it must be possible 
from the context of the explanation, to extract and formulate precisely the law or 
fact missing, thus turning the explanation into a complete one.
In the case of partial explanations however, it is not possible to give the exact 
formulation of the law that is imprecisely stated in the premises, or missing. This 
may be so because some of the relevant characteristics of the particular facts of the 
explanans or the explanandum are either missing, or are not stated with sufficient 
specificity so that, they can be brought ‘in contact’ with all the empirical evidence 
available and the general law be inferred. Partial explanations are not, strictly 
speaking, D-N explanations, since the explanandum cannot be logically deduced 
from the premises. They are just explanation sketches, which need filling out of 
their missing or imprecise terms in order to be turned into full explanations. The 
direction that our investigation into the missing elements will take, is usually 
suggested by the empirical facts and the concepts that already feature in the 
explanation sketch. This process is empirical and depends crucially on whether the 
explanation sketch on which it is based, is genuinely explanatory or only 
apparently so. For, an explanation sketch which is based on scientifically 
acceptable empirical evidence and theories, will indicate the ways in which its
12
precision can be increased and the relevant factors specified. On the other hand, 
‘pseudo’-explanation sketches are, so to say, ‘sterile’, since they give no clues as to 
what amendments and additions they need, in order to be turned into full 
explanations with empirically testable explanantia.
The Methodological Criticisms
Hempel construed as a necessary condition for the adequacy of an action- 
explanation sketch that it makes at least implicit reference to a law-sketch that can, 
with further empirical enquiry, be turned into a full-blown law. However, even this 
‘watered-down’ requirement for adequacy is rarely met by actual scientific 
explanations of human action. This is a problem that, by itself, is not sufficient to 
render the model inadequate as an exposition of the logical structure of such 
explanations. Hempel’s theory of explanation provides us with a schema that is 
supposed to give us insights into what the notion of explanation amounts to, and 
set an ideal standard for which all explanations must strive; it does not simply 
describe the actual process of explanation as it is performed by scientists or 
laymen.
However, W. Dray7, argued that the discrepancy that exists between ‘ideal’ 
covering-law explanations or even explanation sketches of the kind specified 
above, and explanations as they are actually given by historians (or, for that matter, 
by social scientists and psychologists), is due to the fact that the model fails to 
capture the nature of the concept of explanation in these sciences. He offered 
negative arguments based on methodological considerations, as well as a positive 
theory of the model of ‘rational explanation’, which he thought to be peculiar to 
human action.
Dray’s arguments do not bear directly on the logic of action-explanation as this 
is laid out by Hempel’s model, and so do not amount to a refutation o f the model.
7 See Dray [1957] and [1963].
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The standpoint from which Dray argues is the methodological one, claiming that 
Hempel’s theory is methodologically fruitless for explanation in the Social 
Sciences. Explanations that are considered as adequate by practitioners in these 
fields, need not, and in fact do not refer to general laws. To consider them as 
explanation-sketches, which point the way to the development of full-fledged 
covering-laws, is fruitless from the methodological point of view, since any laws 
that might be proposed, will most probably be either vacuous or of a very low level 
of generality; in either case they will confer no additional force to the already 
existing explanation in terms of the agent’s reasons. Serious, explanatory causal 
laws are just not suggested by explanations that are actually given by social 
scientists and historians. To insist that some covering law must be tacitly assumed 
by any adequate explanation in these fields, Dray argued, is to miss the normative 
element, which is the most important feature of such explanations. The objective of 
the historian, for example, in explaining the actions of historical figures, is to show 
them as being rational in the light of the agent’s conjectured aims and beliefs.. To 
state a general hypothesis of the form ‘all rational agents in such and such 
circumstances, act in such and such a way’ does not amount to a demonstration of 
the action’s rationality in the particular conditions obtaining. Such a regularity 
does not help us in our appraisal of the action in its particularity.
Although Dray’s arguments make a strong case against the model, his own 
positive account of the explanation of action is not fully developed, and has raised
Q
cogent criticisms from causal theorists. Hempel , in his own reply to Dray’s 
criticisms, is mainly concerned with showing that, unless his model is accepted, 
there can be no standard of complete explanation of action; an account such as 
Dray’s, only succeeds in showing why an action was, from the agent’s point of 
view, a reasonable thing to do, but not why the agent did, in fact, perform the 
action. On Dray’s account, we can show that the agent had reasons for acting as he 
did, but we cannot show why he did act that way. Only with the additional 
covering-law premise can an action-explanation be complete, in the sense of 
closing the entailment gap, and allowing us to assert that, had we known the 
explanantia before the action, we would have predicted with certainty that it would
8 e.g. in Hempel [1963] and [1965].
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follow. Hempel’s criticism against Dray has been a standard criticism of causalists, 
in defence of their thesis that only a causal theory can provide complete 
explanations of human actions. The criticism is cogent as far as the inadequacy of 
Dray’s account is concerned; but it does not show that the causal theory of action- 
explanations must be correct. In particular, Dray’s arguments against the Causal- 
Nomological Theory are sufficient to show its implausibility as far as its construal 
of action-explanations is concerned.
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CHAPTER 2: DAVIDSON’S CAUSAL THEORY OF ACTION
D. Davidson, with his Causal Theory of Action, attempts to deny the causalist’s 
commitment to covering-law explanations, while retaining the claim that human 
action affords a causal analysis. Davidson recognised the force of the arguments 
against the Causal-Nomological Theory, and proposed an analysis of action in 
terms of event causation, without direct recourse to nomic generalisations to 
support the causal connection between reasons and actions. His solution is based 
on a simple and elegant ontology of events and an ingenious construal of the 
logical form of singular causal and action sentences. It is also supplemented by a 
theory of ‘non-reductive’ materialism, the theory of Anomalous Monism, whose 
main tenets were already suggested in his influential first paper on the theory of 
action9, but was fully developed and defended in his subsequent works10. 
Davidson’s contribution to the Philosophy of Action, has triggered off the revival 
of the Causal Theory and has itself come to occupy a distinct and influential 
position in the spectrum of theories of action. However, it has also drawn some 
powerful arguments against it, the most important of which, I will try to modify 
and present in the next chapter. But first, I will give an outline of the essentials of 
Davidson’s theories. Although the question of the analysis of action is inextricably 
linked with the question of its explanation, I will attempt here to separate 
Davidson’s answers to the two questions, since my arguments in the next chapter 
will be directed against his model for the explanation of action, bearing only 
indirectly on his analysis.
The Analysis o f  Action
9 ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, in Davidson [1980], pp.3-19. (Hereafter ARC)
10 Mainly in ‘Mental Events’, in Davidson [1980], pp.207-27 (Hereafter ME)
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With his theory, Davidson purports to provide an analysis of action in terms of 
events and the relation of event causation. This analysis is not meant to be a 
conceptual one, i.e. it does not claim to analyse what we mean when we use the 
concepts of agency and action11. Our notions of agency and action may be thought 
as basic as that of causation, but they might still be just ways of talking, involving 
no commitment to basic entities such as actions and agents, or relations such as 
that of agent-causation. Thus, Davidson’s theory is conceived as an ontological 
analysis of action, admitting as ontologically basic only events which are causally 
related. To be sure, in the course of arguing for his theory, Davidson appeals to our 
ordinary notions, but he does this only to show that, if his theory is correct, then 
they need not commit us to the existence of any other entities besides events, or 
any other relation besides the causal one.
Events, in Davidson’s theory, are thought to be concrete particulars, referred to 
by singular statements such as ‘the death of Caesar’, ‘the first explosion of atomic 
bomb in war history’, ‘John’s twentieth birthday’. Events can take different true 
descriptions as, for example, ‘the first explosion of atomic bomb in war history’, 
can also be described as ‘the explosion at Hiroshima on 6th August 1945’; both 
descriptions refer to the same concrete event, whose existence is independent of 
any linguistic expression of it.
The causal relation is understood to be a contingent dependency relation, whose 
relata are events. So, a singular causal statement of the form ‘c causes e’, reports an 
extensional relation between the concrete particulars c and e; if ‘c causes e’ is a 
true causal statement, we can substitute, salva veritate, for c and e, any of their 
logical equivalents or any singular terms referring to them. For example, the truth 
of the singular causal statement, ‘the short-circuit caused the fire’, is not affected 
by replacement of ‘the fire’ by some other true description of the event referred to. 
So, if the first statement is true, we can also truly assert that, ‘the short-circuit 
caused the most amazing spectacle I have ever seen’, provided that ‘the most 
amazing...’ is a true description of the event picked out by the term ‘the fire’. 
Davidson does not attempt to provide an analysis of causation, but only an analysis
11 This position follows from Davidson’s arguments in ‘Agency’, in Davidson [1980] 
(hereafter EAE), pp.43-61
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of the logical form  of singular causal statements, claiming that the two tasks are 
independent. His arguments12, yield the conclusion that a singular causal sentence 
does not entail any particular law that connects the cause and the effect under the 
descriptions used in the sentence. What they entail, is that some law, that uses 
some appropriate true descriptions of the events involved, exists. We can pick out 
the events related as cause and effect, without using, or suggesting, the appropriate 
descriptions under which they are lawfully related: Knowing that a singular causal 
statement is true, does not entail knowing, or even having some idea of, the law 
that subsumes the events related. For example, one may know that ‘the short- 
circuit caused the fire’, even if he has no idea of the law that ‘grounds’ this causal 
relation, and even if the law describes the cause and the effect using entirely 
different terms than ‘short-circuit’, and ‘fire’.
Using the extensionality of the causal relation, Davidson was able to retain the 
causal thesis, while rejecting Hempel’s covering-law model for the explanation of 
action. He claimed that the agent’s reasons may still be causes of his actions, even 
if there are no causal laws connecting the corresponding events when described as 
reasons and actions. So, according to his analysis, intentional action consists in 
behaviour which is caused by the onset of a complex mental state of the agent. This 
mental state he called a primary reason for the action, and took as its necessary 
constituents a pro-attitude of the agent towards actions of a specified kind, and a 
belief of the agent that the action, under the description believed by him to be true, 
is of this specified kind.
The first thing to note here is the ambiguity of the locution ‘consists in’.
Davidson advanced his analysis of intentional action as an analysis in terms of
necessary, but not sufficient conditions, thinking that a fu ll analysis in terms of
11necessary and sufficient conditions would subsequently become possible . But, in
12 Developed mainly in his ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’ and ‘Causal Relations’, 
in ‘EAE’, pp. 105-22 and 149-62 respectively.
13 As, for example the concluding sentences from ‘ARC’, p. 19, suggest: ‘ Some causes have 
no agents. Among these agentleses causes are the states and changes of state in persons which, 
because, they are reasons as well as causes, constitute certain events free and intentional actions’.
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his later papers, he came to believe that a full analysis was not, after all, possible14. 
What forced him to this pessimistic for his theory view, was consideration of the 
problem of so-called deviant, or wayward causal chains. Cases involving deviant 
causal chains were introduced as counterexamples to the Causal Theory of Action, 
by R.Chisholm15, and were recognised by Davidson as presenting a real problem 
for it. They show that the causal analysis of action proposed is too broad to capture 
exactly the class of actions, since it counts as intentional action behaviour that we 
would intuitively recognise as non-intentional. The example given by Davidson 
himself, is that of a climber who ‘might want to rid himself of the weight and 
danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his 
hold on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and 
want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it might be 
the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it intentionally’.16
In this example, we have a case where all of Davidson’s conditions are fulfilled, 
since the climber’s want and belief constitute a primary reason, which is also a 
cause of his behaviour. Nevertheless, our intuition strongly suggests that the 
climber’s loosening of his hold is not an intentional action. The problem is that the 
climber’s primary reason did not cause the behaviour in the right sort o f  way, in a 
way that is, that would allow us to say that he acted intentionally. The reason 
caused the behaviour via a deviant path, in the same sort of way that fearful 
thoughts say, may cause someone to perspire or tremble. Perspiration and 
trembling can have volitional and cognitive states as causes, but they certainly are 
not actions, but reflexes. Similarly, the climber’s loosening of his hold on the rope 
cannot be classified as intentional action, as Davidson’s theory would seem to 
require if we accepted his conditions as sufficient.
The problem is that Davidson cannot add a clause to the effect that the agent’s 
reasons must cause the behaviour in the right sort o f  way, since the only thing that 
one can mean by that, is that the agent acted intentionally. Hence, such an addition
,4See for example his ‘Freedom to Act’, in EAE’, p.80: ‘We must count our search for a 
causal analysis of «A is free to do x» a failure.’
15 See his [1966], paper.
16 ‘Freedom to Act’, in ‘EAE’, p.79.
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would not help Davidson, since it would appeal to the very notion that he set out to 
analyse, that of intentionality.
The problem of deviant causal chains has been a standard theme in the literature 
on the Philosophy of Action, and many attempts have been made to treat it. It will 
not be my main concern here, since I think that the argument that I will present 
against Davidson’ theory will show it to be a symptom of a deeper problem that the 
theory faces. However, Davidson’s admittance that a solution is not forthcoming, 
raises a question as to how we should understand his position. If a fu ll analysis of 
intentional action is not possible, then he cannot claim that the ‘embarrassing 
entity’ that it represents has been removed completely from the ‘world’s furniture’, 
for it is still needed to distinguish between the deviant and the non-deviant cases of 
causation of behaviour by reasons. Hence, without necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the analysis of intentional action, ‘actionist’ residues must remain in 
the ‘world’s furniture’, and thus the Causal Theory of Action is indefensible as a 
theory of ontological reduction of intentional action.17 In view of these 
considerations, Davidson’s position seems puzzling to me. This is why I will 
consider his theory as an attempt to provide a fu ll analysis of action, and argue 
against it without using the counterexamples of deviant causal chains. As said 
before, I believe that there is an underlying problem that will become apparent after 
examination of his model for the explanation of action. Hence, for the moment, I 
will set aside the problem presented by deviant causal chains, and treat Davidson’s 
analysis as a fu ll ontological analysis of intentional action.
I have reconstructed Davidson’s analysis as an analysis of intentional action, 
rather than simply of action, since, for him, the latter is secondary to the former. 
An agent may act non-intentionally only if under some other true description, he is 
acting intentionally. If, for example, I mistakenly turn on the ventilator, thinking 
that the switch on the wall was the light switch, I have intentionally done 
something, namely, flipped the switch. For Davidson an action is an event (with the 
right sort of causes), that can take on different descriptions: Under some of these 
descriptions it is intentional, under some others, it is not. But for an event to be an 
action at all, there must be a description that makes it an intentional action.
17 For a similar view on Davidson’s position ,see Bishop [1989], pp. 101-5.
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Davidson takes the ‘extreme minimising’ view on the issue of the individuation 
of action. This is brought out by the term ‘accordion effect’ which characterises the 
way we can shorten the description of an action down to the agent’s bodily 
movements, or, we can stretch it to its furthest consequences. However, despite all 
this contracting and expanding, the action that the agent performs remains the 
same; it is only the descriptions in terms of its causes or effects that change. If for 
example A wakes up her husband who is sleeping in the room by turning on the 
light, the only event of which A is the agent, is the movement of her hand. All 
other descriptions, like e.g. ‘flipping the switch’, ‘turning on the light’, 
‘illuminating the room’, ‘waking up her sleeping husband’, are descriptions of the 
same primitive (basic) action in terms of its effects. Under some of these 
descriptions, A’s action is intentional (e.g. ‘turning on the light’), under some 
others it is unintentional (e.g. waking up her husband). Hence, Davidson’s view 
amounts to saying that all actions are, ultimately, bodily movements. The richness 
with which we can describe actions, is due to the multitude and variety of the 
effects of agents’ movements; behind it, there is only the bodily movement itself.
The question of the individuation of action is veiy important in itself and has 
given rise to great controversies between philosophers of action. In my treatment of 
Davidson’s theory, I will not be concerned with it, taking his ‘extreme minimising’ 
view for granted. So, whenever I speak about actions, I will mean the descriptions 
of some intentional bodily behaviour in terms of its effects (or circumstances); the 
descriptum will always be a single event: the agent’s intentional primitive action.
Davidson’s Model for Singular Action Explanations
Let us examine now the model for singular explanation of action which is proposed
1 Stby Davidson. According to it, there are three necessary conditions for an adequate 
explanation of action:
18 This is a reconstruction of Davidson’s views on the explanation of action which follows, to 
an extent, Antony’s ([1989]). Davidson, as far as I know, has never presented his views in this way. 
The justification for my reconstruction will become, I believe, apparent, with the qualifying remarks 
that follow.
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1. Any attribution of mental attitudes to the agent contained in the explanation, 
must be true.(The Truth Condition).
2. The explanation must attribute to the agent, in accordance with the Truth 
Condition, a primary reason, consisting of a certain pro-attitude and belief, that 
display in their light the action as being reasonable. (The Rationality Condition).
3. The advent of the primary reason featuring in the explanans, must be the 
cause of the action. (The Causal Condition).
Let us look at the role that each condition plays in the explanation of action:
1. The Truth Condition is necessary if we are to take a realist stance towards 
the propositional attitudes that are supposed to populate the mind of the agent, 
providing the content of his reasons for action. By propositional or intentional 
attitudes, we mean mental states that are expressed by verbs like believing, 
desiring, expecting, intending, knowing, and so on, and which exhibit the 
characteristic of being directed at, or being about, existing, or non-existing objects 
or states of affairs. Their ascription to agents creates non-extensional contexts, i.e. 
sentences whose truth-value may change after substitution of one of their terms by 
one of its logical equivalents, or by a term which is co-referrent with it. For 
example, the sentence, ‘A knows that the capital of Chile is in South America’, 
may be true, with the sentence, ‘A knows that Santiago is in South America’, 
being false.
It is not clear to me, what is the exact treatment of the intentionality of mental 
states by Davidson, but, at least, this much is certain: That he is a realist about 
events that can (truly) be described as the advent of a belief, a desire, a want, or, 
more generally, a pro attitude. That is, when we describe an event e, as the coming 
to believe that b by agent A, we are giving a true description of a real entity, 
namely of e. In this sense, Davidson is a realist about propositional attitudes, even 
though he is not committed to the existence of intentional states or properties (or, 
for that matter, to the existence of any state or property). The question of how he 
accounts for the intentionality of these descriptions, of how, that is, they are 
connected to the real entities in the world, is a separate issue, which I will not take 
up here.
So, the Truth Condition is a necessary condition for taking a realist stance 
towards the propositional attitudes, which, in turn, is necessaiy for rationalisation
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being a type of causal explanation. For, if Davidson was not a realist about the 
attribution of desires and beliefs, then he could barely explain an action by 
reference to them. There has to be some sense in which it is true to say of an agent 
A that she came to believe that b, in order to be in a position to claim that A’s 
belief that b, was part of the cause of the action. If the existence of the belief is 
disputed by some theorist, then he cannot place that belief in the explanans of the 
action, unless he is a non-realist about explanation, which Davidson clearly is not. 
Davidson’s way of being a realist about propositional attitudes, is by accepting 
that the intentional descriptions of the concrete events, are true descriptions of 
real entities: to describe an event e as the advent of A’s belief that b, is therefore, 
to give a true description of a concrete particular19.
2. The Rationality Condition is accepted, with certain modifications, by 
causalists and non-causalists alike, as a necessary condition for the explanation of 
action. It is supposed to ensure ‘that the agent is shown in his role of Rational 
Animal’20. In order to do this, we have to be able to construct a practical 
syllogism, with premises the desire and the belief of the agent, and conclusion the 
assertion that the action had some ‘desirability characteristic’ for him. Davidson 
does not accept that practical syllogisms are necessarily involved in practical 
reasoning. Rather, it is part of the analysis of our concept of a reason for which an 
agent acted, that it is possible that such a syllogism be constructed. It is not 
necessary that the logical (or psychological) steps of the argument are actually 
followed in the process of forming an intention to act. It is only necessary that the 
reason for the action possessed by the agent, allows for such a practical syllogism 
to be constructed.
Thus, a primary reason justifies an action only in a weak sense, showing it to 
have a property which is desirable for the agent. It does not justify it in the strong
19 Whether reasons can be taken as causes of action has been the point of an objection raised 
by R.Stoecker, on the grounds that reasons are not events. (See his [1993] paper) This is an 
interesting issue, which I will not take up here, especially in view of Davidson’s insistence that the 
advent o f a reason can be considered as the cause of an action. (See his ‘Reply to Stoecker’ in the 
same volume.). In what follows, whenever I refer to a reason as the cause o f an action, I will mean, 
as Davidson does, the advent of that reason.
20 ARC, in EAE, p.8.
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sense of the word, i.e. showing it to be desirable in itself. Still, it satisfies our 
demand to read rationality in the action, to see it, that is, as a piece of behaviour 
which is coherent with a certain trait, preference or desire of the agent. If we were 
not in a position to produce even a single property of the action that seemed 
appealing to the agent, then the action would be unexplainable, indeed it could not 
be characterised as action at all.
Note that a primary reason, being a pair of intentional states, can explain an 
action, only insofar as the action is described in a way that is known to the agent. 
For example, we cannot explain Oedipus’ striking of his father by his desire to 
punish the rude old man that was found in his way. Although the two descriptions 
(‘striking the rude old man’ and ‘striking his father’), apply to the same action 
(event), the latter is explained only when described as ‘a striking of a rude old 
man’. Only the descriptions which are thought by the agent to be true, not the true 
descriptions, matter in explanation. The intensionality of mental attitudes, infects 
the whole action explanation.
3. The Causal Condition must be included as a necessary condition in the 
analysis of action explanation by any causal theory of action. Davidson proposed it 
as a necessary condition, supporting it with an argument against any theory that 
does not include such a condition in it. How can we distinguish, Davidson asked, 
between an agent’s acting because o f  her reasons, and her acting and merely 
having these reasons? An agent may have adequate reasons for an action, but 
nevertheless perform it for a different set of (adequate) reasons that she also 
possessed at the time of the action. Consider for example the following case, 
where there is a clear distinction between: (i) She exercised and she wanted to 
reduce weight, and thought exercise would do it, and (ii), She exercised because 
she wanted to reduce weight, and thought exercise would do it, which cannot be 
accounted for by explanation models that contain only the Truth and the 
Rationality Conditions.
Thus, merely citing the reasons that the agent possessed at the time of action, is 
not enough for explanation. At most it may be enough for justification. Therefore, 
a further condition is needed to supplement the first two, so that justification is 
turned into explanation. Explanation by non-causal rationalisation is, Davidson 
argued, a kind of explanation which is not well understood, and which the non-
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causal theorists had not defended adequately, by explaining how it works. Causal 
explanation, on the other hand, is a perfectly legitimate kind of explanation, a kind 
which is understood as well as any. So, Davidson concluded, the only viable 
proposal for accounting for the explanatory force of ‘because’ in (ii), is the causal 
one. Causation guarantees that there exists a real connection between reasons and 
action: The onset of a reason is the cause (or a part of the cause) of the action, and 
this is enough to ensure a link between the two, a link that makes reasons 
explanatorily relevant in a well understood way.
Hence, Davidson views rationalisation as a kind of causal explanation of a 
special class of events that are called actions. It is certain that he regards 
rationalisations as adequate explanations, but whether he thinks they are complete 
is not clear, since he is not trying to characterise explanation generally and thus 
make plain what he would take to be a complete explanation. He writes:
‘ W e may jo in  in lauding as an ideal explanation a description o f  antecedents and a 
specification o f  laws such that the explanandum can be deduced; but how much less still 
counts as explanation? It seems to me that we have in action a particularly good specimen 
for study; since we agree that one way o f  explaining actions is by giving the agent’s 
reasons, we can concentrate on the relatively clear question what reason explanations are 
like, and set aside the more diffuse problem o f  characterising explanation generally.’21
Anomalous Monism
Davidson’s Causal Theory of Action is supplemented by a Theory of Mind 
which he calls Anomalous Monism. In it, he combines three apparently 
inconsistent principles, by endorsing a ‘token-token’ Identity Thesis. The three 
principles are stated as follows:
1. The Principle of Causal Interaction: ‘At least some mental events interact 
causally with physical events’.
21 In ‘Hempel on Explaining Action’, EAE, p.263.
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2. The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: ‘Events related as 
cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws’.
3. The Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental: ‘There are no strict,
22deterministic laws, on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’.
The apparent contradiction is that the first two principles appear to entail the 
denial of the third: If there are mental events that are causally related to physical 
events, then, by the second principle, they must fall under strict laws; but, by the 
third principle, there are no laws that can be used to predict and explain mental 
events.23 Davidson escapes the seeming contradiction by affirming the thesis of 
Anomalous Monism, while asserting the extensionality of singular causal 
statements and the linguistic (and hence intensional) character of laws. Anomalous 
Monism is the claim that every mental event is token-identical to some physical 
event, but mental types are not identical, or reducible to physical types. Davidson’s 
understanding of singular causal sentences, has already been presented: Causal 
relations hold between events; events are particulars that can take on an indefinite 
number of descriptions, and only under some of these description, they can 
instantiate laws. Hence, laws are linguistic, relating events only insofar as the latter 
are described one way or another.
Thus, the apparent contradiction is resolved as follows: An event which has a 
mental description, and which is causally connected to some physical event (as, 
according to the first principle, at least some mental events are), is subsumed under 
the strict law that (according to the second principle) must exist covering the 
connection, only when physically described. Hence, the third principle is not 
violated, since no mental descriptions of events feature in strict laws.
Most aspects of Anomalous Monism are already^either explicit or implicit in his 
Causal Theory of Action. The Principle of Causal Interaction has a clear 
manifestation in actions: Actions are physical events (bodily movements), which
22 In his ‘Mental Events’, in ‘EAE’, pp.207-27
23 As stated, Davidson’s third principle is not strictly correct: Mental events can be predicted 
and explained using strict laws, since every mental event is identical to some physical event, and 
physical events can be explained and described by strict laws. Hence, the principle must be 
understood as saying that there are no strict laws that contain mental descriptions of events.
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are causally related to mental events (the onsets of reasons). Furthermore, his claim 
that the Causal-Nomological Theory of Action was not the only causal alternative 
involved accepting the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, but 
understanding the logical form of singular causal statements along the lines 
sketched out above. Finally, the token-token identity thesis, also has a 
manifestation in his Causal Theory of Action: Reasons and actions are events that 
can take both a mental (intentional) and a physical description. Of course, in 
‘Actions Reasons and Causes’, Davidson did not go all the way to outright denial 
of the possibility of strict psychological and psychophysical laws, but his thesis 
that reasons need not be lawfully related to actions, suggests at least some 
scepticism as to whether they could be so related.
Thus, Anomalous Monism apparently fits well with Davidson’s Causal Theory 
of Action: The causal connection between reasons and action could be thought of 
as the paradigmatic case where all the principles on which Anomalous Monism is 
based, are instantiated without contradiction. However, Davidson’s emphatic 
denial24 of the possibility of formulating strict laws featuring mental terms has, 
according to some critics, serious consequences for his Theory of Mind. In the 
next chapter, I will present a version of this type of criticism, and assess its 
bearing on Davidson’s theory of action.
24 His arguments are expounded in his ‘Mental Events’ as well as ‘Psychology as 
Philosophy’, in ‘EAE’.
27
CHAPTER 3: A CRITICISM OF THE THEORY
Introduction
D.Davidson’s Anomalous Monism has been widely criticised for rendering 
the mental causally inert. The objection is based on the fact that, in Davidson’s 
theory, events that enter into causal relations instantiate the laws that subsume 
these relations, only when physically described. Davidson’s token identity thesis, 
the claim, that is, that the mental and the physical descriptions both apply to the 
same entities while mental types are irreducible to physical types, does not save, 
according to the critics, the theory from the charge of Epiphenomenalism. They 
argue that, since the causal relations involving mental events are backed only by 
physical laws which make use of physical descriptions of the events related, then 
the latter are causes and effects only in virtue o f  their physical properties and not 
in virtue o f  their mental properties. Another way of putting it, is to say that events 
enter into causal relations qua physical and not qua mental events. Thus, the 
critics conclude, Davidson’s Anomalous Monism, renders the mental causally 
inert and hence the theory collapses to a type of Epiphenomenalism.
The consequences for Davidson’s Causal Theory of Action are no less serious, 
since, if the criticism is correct, reasons are not causes of actions in virtue of their 
intentional characteristics (i.e. their content), but in virtue of their physical ones. 
The fact that a person’s belief is a belief thatp, and that her desire is a desire to q, 
will be as causally relevant to her action as is the brick’s colour to the brick’s 
breaking of the window. It might be thought then, that if Davidson’s theory is true, 
we consider the content of propositional attitudes as relevant for the purposes of 
explanation of action, only because it happens to co-exist with some physical
25 See e.g. Stoutland [1980] and [1985], and Honderich [1982].
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property which is responsible for the causal efficacy of events that we describe as 
mental. This conclusion, would certainly render Davidson’s model for the 
explanation of actions only pragmatically adequate, granting it no right to claim 
that it captures the real explanatory relation between actions and their 
determinants.
The Causal Theory of Action, as construed by Davidson in his early work, does 
not stand or fall with Anomalous Monism, since it does not make any negative 
claim about the existence of laws containing psychological terms. The claim is 
rather that such laws need not exist for the causal theory to be true. However, if 
the criticism were correct, Davidson’s causal theory would lose much of its 
appeal, since it would not be able to hold the middle ground between the non- 
causal and the causal-nomological approach any longer. To retain his thesis that 
reasons are causally connected to actions, Davidson would have to make some 
concessions to the nomological, or the functionalist theories and allow for some 
lawful connections between the mental and the physical. As I will attempt to show 
in the upcoming discussion, such a concession is radically at odds with Davidson’s 
overall philosophical position; hence, I believe that we should view this sort of 
criticisms as endangering not only his Anomalous Monism, but also his theory of 
action, seen as a distinct causal theory.
Davidson has replied26 to this kind of criticism by pointing out that his critics 
have misconstrued his ontology of events. Events do not enter into causal relations 
qua mental or qua physical. The mental and the physical languages are just ways 
of talking, ways of describing things, that make no claim about the existence of 
anything apart from events. Thus, Davidson rejects the distinction between 
causation by an event in virtue of some property x, and causation by the same 
event in virtue of some other property y that it possesses, as senseless. It is events 
‘tout court’ that cause or are caused, their properties only being characteristics that 
we attach to them in order to describe them one way or another. So, if  a statement 
of a particular causal interaction is true, then so will be any other statement of that 
interaction, provided that it uses true descriptions of the events involved; hence,
26 See e.g. Davidson [1987] and [1993].
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even the events that are (truly) described in mental terms can be causes and 
effects. The mental is, after all, as causally efficacious as the physical.
The Problem o f Congruence in Explanation
I.
Davidson’s reply is based on ontological considerations, which I will not 
attempt to rebut directly here, but only to undermine, by construing the arguments 
against him as arguments that bear on the problem of explanation, which, I think, 
subsists even if we accept Davidson’s ontological commitments. Whether singular 
causation requires only the existence of events and not of their properties, is a 
metaphysical issue which will be decided on the basis of other considerations apart 
from the ones pertaining to the problem of action. This ontological thesis may be 
plausible, but, whether true or false, it still leaves us with the problem of 
explanation of action, which, I will try to show remains unsolved by Davidson’s 
theory.
Philosophers like F. Stoutland27 and L. Antony28 have concentrated on 
Davidson’s model for action explanation and have found it wanting. Of course, 
their criticisms take off from different standpoints and the points they make differ 
significantly in many respects, but, I believe, concern about the same problem 
underlies both criticisms. Antony calls it the Problem of Explanatory Force, 
whereas Stoutland calls it the Problem Of Congruence. I will use Stoutland’s term 
which, I think, is more appropriate for the conclusion I want to reach.
Explanation contexts are non-extensional, that is, the validity of an explanation 
depends on the descriptions of the explanantia and the explanandum. In 
Davidson’s theory, the onsets of desires and beliefs which are intentional 
descriptions of events that also have a physical description, feature in the 
rationalisation of the action, and thereby, are supposed to explain it. These
27 Stoutland op. cit.
28 Antony op. cit.
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intentional descriptions are not used in the strict, deterministic laws that back the 
causal connection posited by Davidson, and hence, cannot be used as premises in a 
subsumptive explanation of action. It is rather the physical descriptions of these 
events that would stand as part of the explanans in such a covering-law 
explanation. This is because the physical descriptions are nomic descriptions, they 
classify events in types that feature in laws connecting them to other types of 
events. Therefore, the intentionality of desires and beliefs can play no part in a 
complete, Hempelean explanation of action. If Davidson’s theory cannot offer an 
alternative, convincing model for action explanation that secures a central role to 
reasons, then reasons will lose their explanatory force.
Davidson’s theory, makes use of two languages that run in parallel being 
irreducible to each other, and providing descriptions of the same entities, the 
concrete events. One is the language of Psychology that contains intentional terms 
such as belief, desire, hope, want, etc., as well as action verbs, in order to describe 
events that take place inside of human agents’ minds and events that are classified 
as actions respectively. The intentional terms that are used by Psychology are not 
nomic terms, in the sense that they cannot, in principle, feature in strict, 
deterministic laws that explain and predict the events that they describe. Davidson 
has argued extensively for this point, but he has never denied the possibility of 
non-lawful generalisations expressible in the language of Psychology. However, 
these generalisations cannot serve as premises in covering law explanations, since, 
as he has argued, they contain inescapable ‘ceteris paribus’ clauses and hence, they 
could not be developed into strict, exceptionless laws.
The other language is the language of the Physical Sciences, which is 
considered by Davidson to comprise a closed system in the sense that it has the 
capacity to describe, predict and explain any event in the world, using only terms 
from its own vocabulary. Thus, the physical language can, in principle, 
accommodate ‘homonomic’ laws, laws that is, that can be developed and refined 
in order to accommodate new phenomena, without resorting to descriptions 
outside the domain of the language. The physical language can therefore be used
29 Or, at least, any event that enters into causal relations. See his ‘Mental Events’, p. 208 in
EAE..
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to describe the events involved in action explanations, in such a way as to 
subsume them under a law.
Events, in themselves are neither mental nor physical : they are just particulars 
that can be described either way. But, since the physical language has the capacity 
to describe, predict and fully explain all events, I think we are justified in saying 
that, in Davidson theory, it holds a privileged position. However, this privilege 
does not stem from the reducibility of psychological to physical predicates, 
because such reducibility is denied by Davidson.
II.
The fact that the two languages are detached creates a problem for Davidson’s 
model of action explanations. Explanation is description-relative and as such, it 
can only be expressed in either one of the two languages. When we explain a 
particular action by citing the agents’ reasons which, on that occasion, were also 
causes, we are using intentional terms. These reasons make the action seem a 
reasonable thing to do, by placing it into a rational pattern of behaviour. This 
display of rationality, does not take into account any physical considerations. For 
example, our evidence for ascribing intentionality to a particular piece of 
behaviour is not derived from knowledge of physical laws, or from observation of 
physical events. Our ascription depends on rational considerations, on our demand 
that the behaviour is understood as meaningful action, as part of a pattern that 
coheres with social conventions and habits, or with further actions and intentional 
states ( beliefs, desires, expectations, etc. ) that we ascribe to the agent.
All the above is, in Davidson's view, part of what action explanations consist 
of. But, Davidson also added the Causal Condition, in order to account for the 
explanatory force of rationalisations. So, in citing the reason for an action, we also 
denote its cause, describing it in intentional terms, in terms, that is, that do not 
indicate the full-blown deterministic law that covers the events in question. 
Davidson assumes that the full, deterministic law that subsumes the events, must 
do so by describing them in physical terms, and thus be a physical law. Intentional 
terms are then non-nomic terms, and, therefore, when we include in a singular 
explanation the statement that a reason was the cause of an action, we are not 
using any nomic property to back it. The question is then, whether such an
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explanation in terms that are not nomic, can, in any sense be considered as 
adequate. Remember that for Davidson, an adequate explanation of A 's  x-ing, 
should include the following statements:
i) That A possessed a desire for some end y, and the belief that x-ing was a 
means for y.
ii) That A's desire and belief caused his x-ing.
The singular causal statement asserted in (ii) and the fact that (i) accords with 
the Rationality and Truth conditions is, according to Davidson, all we need in 
order to have an adequate explanation of A’s x-ing. But there is another question, 
an epistemological one, that we need to consider here: Can we justify the assertion 
that the above explanation of A’s x-ing is adequate? The question is distinct from 
the one posed above (i.e. what constitutes an adequate explanation), since it 
concerns the grounds that we have for supporting the claim for adequacy.30 
However, if no justification for this claim can be found, then the claim itself will, 
inevitably, become questionable; it is extremely implausible to hold that our 
reasons-explanations of actions are adequate, but we cannot find any solid ground 
to support any of them.
III.
Are there any grounds to support the claim for the adequacy of a singular 
explanation construed according to Davidson’s model? It is clear that Davidson 
cannot justify it by appeal to strict covering laws. If I understand him correctly, his 
justification seems to lie in the assurance that we can be confident in our belief 
that a particular reason caused a particular action, without knowing their nomic 
descriptions. Our confidence, supposedly stems from our knowledge of non-strict 
generalisations (truisms) that connect the reasons with the action involved.
30 Cf. D.-H. Ruben’s questions of what counts as a full explanation, and of how we can justify a 
claim that some explanation is full, in his [1990] article. In my argument, I use the word ‘adequate’ 
to approach to what Davidson means with ‘something less than explanation, that still counts as 
explanation’. The term is not meant in its pragmatic sense, since I don’t think that Davidson holds 
the view that reasons explanation is only pragmatically adequate. Perhaps the only appropriate 
words that could be used to describe an explanation that captures the ‘real’ explanatory relation of 
the explanans to the explanandum, are ‘full’ and ‘partial’ explanation, however, in view of the 
pragmatic connotations o f ‘partial’ which I want to avoid, and of Davidson’s attempt to play down 
the importance of full explanations, 1 choose a deflationary term such as ‘adequate’.
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I believe that Davidson's arguments conflate causation with explanation. The
truth of a singular causal statement may remain unaffected after substitution of a
term with one which is co-referrent, but the same does not hold for singular
explanation. We may be able to pick out a cause using properties that are
irrelevant to the causal law that covers it, but we cannot pick out an explanans by
such an irrelevant feature, because features are precisely what matters in
explanation. This is stressed by Hempel, among others, when he says that ‘the
object of description and explanation in every branch in empirical science is
always the occurrence of an event of a certain kind  at a given place and time, or
• • ^  1in a given empirical object....at a certain time’ .
So, to justify an explanation as adequate, we have to justify our choice of 
features. In particular, in a causal explanation, we need to show that the 
description we are using is causally relevant. To pick out the cause by some 
irrelevant feature, is not enough for the purposes of explanation; in scientific 
explanation we do much better than cite the cause by using any of its true 
descriptions.32 By the same token, it is a legitimate demand on any causal 
explanation, that it can be shown to describe the events which are related as cause 
and effect, in terms that are causally relevant. Presumably, one way that this can be 
done, is to show that the events involved, as described, feature in the causal law 
that subsumes the singular relation. Davidson, of course cannot use such strict 
laws to justify his causal claim. But, can we say that his claim that reasons are 
causes, is justified by the truisms that can be expressed in the language of 
Psychology?
At times, Davidson writes as if these truisms can provide the grounds for action 
explanations . Consider the following example: We explain Tom's buying a soft- 
drink on a hot summer day from the kiosk, by his desire to quench his thirst and 
his belief that he can achieve this by buying a soft-drink from the kiosk. Davidson 
says, that our reasons-giving explanation is based on some non-strict
31 See Hempel [1942], p. 233.
32 Cf. also Mackie’s distinction between ‘explanatory’ and ‘productive’ cause, in Mackie 
[1974], Ch. 10.
33 e.g. in 'Hempel on explaining Action', in EAE, pp.261-75 and in Davidson [1987], pp. 44-
45.
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generalisation that is exclusively true of Tom, and which can be filled in by adding 
clauses that take into account all the relevant conditions that must obtain, if  the 
action is to be carried out. So, in our example, such a truism would look like: 'If, 
on a hot summer day, Tom is thirsty, and he sees a kiosk, and he has the amount of
money needed, , then he will tend to buy a soft-drink from the kiosk.’ Davidson
stresses that such a truism would be applicable only to that particular agent, and 
not hold as a universal generalisation. Moreover, it has no binding force even for 
Tom, because no matter how many clauses we add, we can always think of some 
special circumstances that will not allow Tom to buy his drink, or that would 
even override the tendency itself.
By bringing in generalisations to support reasons-giving explanations, 
Davidson tries to bring his account closer to Hempel's. Of course, he still rejects 
Hempel's requirement that strict laws must be included in the explanans and, 
consequently, he also rejects Hempel's argument thesis. But can such truisms 
enable Davidson to justify his claim that his model provides adequate action 
explanations? I think not, because the generalisations in question are not sufficient 
to distinguish between explanation and justification, which is the problem 
Davidson set out to solve. The reason for this, is that the possibility of finding 
exceptions to the rule, may let in a case where, Tom had the reasons for buying the 
drink which were mentioned above, but, nevertheless, bought it for different 
reasons, or, did not act at all due to some set of circumstances that is not included 
in the clauses of the generalisation. In other words, Davidson's own argument 
against the non-causal theories, i.e. that they cannot account for the explanatory 
force of the 'because' in action explanations, would apply here too.
IV.
Hence, it cannot be claimed that truisms, as such, bring out the causal efficacy 
of reasons with respect to actions, since they do not help us understand the 
intentional properties of reasons as causal properties, any more than a practical 
inference does. It seems then that the only justification that we have for asserting 
the adequacy of a Davidsonian singular causal explanation, is our direct 
knowledge of the operation of the cause. But this knowledge cannot justify our
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choice of descriptions and so, it cannot justify the causal relevance of reasons as 
described.
Consider the example given by Davidson in 'Actions, Reasons and Causes': 
Suppose that a hurricane, which is reported on page 1 of Monday's Times, causes a 
catastrophe, which is reported on page 2 of Tuesday's Tribune. A statement that 
asserts that ‘the event reported on page 1 of Monday's Times, caused the event 
reported on page 2 of Tuesday's Tribune’, is a true statement, regardless of the 
fact that it uses non-nomic descriptions to refer to the relata of the causal relation. 
Hence, the truth of the causal claim, does not entail that a law connecting events as 
described in it exists; not even the claim that 'the hurricane caused the catastrophe' 
entails that there is a law connecting hurricanes with catastrophes. What these 
claims entail, is that some law that covers the case exists, subsuming the related 
events, under some descriptions that are true of them. Granting Davidson these 
points, we can go on and ask: Can we explain the fact34 that the event reported on 
page 1 of Monday's Times occurred, by saying that it was caused by the event 
reported on page 2 of Tuesday's Tribune? Obviously not.
Is the above example analogous to singular action-explanations? Perhaps an 
action-explanation is more like the explanation of the catastrophe in terms of the 
hurricane. This explanation is considerably less ridiculous than the explanation in 
terms of events reported in newspapers, even if, it is 'slightly less ridiculous', as 
Davidson says, to search for laws linking hurricanes to catastrophes. If we look at 
the justification for the claim that the latter explanation is adequate, we may gain 
some insight on how Davidson could or could not justify his model of action- 
explanations.
As Antony35 points out, we can justify a singular explanation in terms of 
hurricanes and catastrophes, by inquiring into what kind of properties are 
characteristic of hurricanes and what are characteristic of catastrophes. This 
inquiry amounts to following an analytical explanatory strategy, as distinct from a
341 assume that the relata of explanation are not events, but facts, or statements. My assumption is 
in accordance with Davidson's view which is expressed, among other places, in 'Causal Relations', 
in EAE, p. 161: 'Explanations typically relate statements, not events.'
35 Op. cit., pp.!68ff.
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subsumptive one. R. Cummins distinguishes between these two strategies in 
scientific explanation, and elaborates on the importance of each one. The 
subsumptive strategy is best exemplified by Hempel’s model of D-N explanation. 
The aim here, is to explain the changes of state in a system by a causal law. These 
laws are provided by transition theories, theories that is, that account for the 
succession of states in the system.
As Cummins argues, the subsumptive strategy is by no means the only strategy 
which is important in scientific explanation. What is often required, is an analysis 
of the properties of a given system and this requires what he calls a property 
theory. The analytical strategy, thus seeks to explain what is it for a given system to 
have a certain property. Of course, this is important for explaining state transition 
also, since it is through property theories that we can explain in virtue of what 
attributes do pairs of events stand in the relation of cause and effect.
A most interesting, and relevant to our discussion, application of property 
theories, is to explain dispositions. The question, ‘what is it for object o, to have 
disposition d?’ is answered by way of analysing how d is instantiated in o. Such an 
explanation, requires property theories to provide ‘instantiation laws’ which state 
the necessary individual ‘components’ that any object must have, in order to 
instatiante the property d. An instantiation law will therefore tell us what 
conditions must a certain system fulfil, in order to manifest the disposition.
We can similarly think of hurricanes as having the dispotitional property of 
producing disasters. But our confidence in the hurricane’s relevance in a causal 
explanation of the disaster, is not based on knowledge of the lawlike regularity 
‘hurricanes cause disasters’. Our confidence is based on our (perhaps rough and 
incomplete) knowledge of the way that the disaster-producing property is 
instantiated in hurricanes. We know, for example, that we can inquire into what 
sort of events make up a hurricane, and what sort of consequences would a 
collection of such events have. On the other hand, a similar analysis of disasters 
would bring up their relevant properties and reveal how can events with such 
properties be caused by the collection of events making up a hurricane. Of course, 
this would require the help of transition theories, i.e. theories that provide causal
36 In Cummins [1983], Ch. I.
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laws linking events at the more ‘fundamental’ level of description. But, by no 
means would the transition theories suffice to back our claim that the occurrence of 
the hurricane causally explains the occurrence of the disaster. Property and 
transition theories have a complementary role in the justification of our singular 
causal explanation.
Therefore, we can see that our confidence in the claim that the occurrence of the 
hurricane causally explains the occurrence of the disaster, does not lie on our 
knowledge of the singular causal statement. To have grounds for accepting such an 
explanation as adequate, is to know that some property theory can be formulated, a 
theory that will explain why the things that have the dispositional property of being 
a hurricane have these kind o f  effects, whereas, other things do not. The concepts 
of hurricane and disaster allow confidence that such a fruitful inquiry can be made. 
The concept of an event reported on page 1 of the Times, does not.
V.
It must be clear, by now, why Davidsonian action explanations cannot be 
analogous to explanations of disasters in terms of hurricanes. Davidson denies that 
there can be any sense in the question ‘in virtue of what properties does event c 
cause event e?’ But without the qualification ‘in virtue o f , how can we make sense 
of a reason’s explaining an action? Is the mere fact that we affirm the causal 
relation enough to give us confidence in a singular causal explanation of action in 
terms of its reasons? That this is not so, is I think manifested in the problem of 
deviant causal chains. There, Davidson’s analysis fails to distinguish between 
deviant and non-deviant causes of behaviour, precisely because it cannot account 
for a desire and beliefs being causes in virtue of their ‘rationalising’ characteristics 
and not in virtue of their ‘disturbing’ ones. Hence, in a singular action explanation, 
merely citing the ‘producing cause’ is not enough. We need to be able to justify our 
choice of descriptions by appeal to some property theory, if no causal law can be 
formulated in their terms.
Could Davidson’s theory allow for the development of such a property theory? 
The first thing to note is that, as Cummins points out , the claim that a property
37 ibid. pp.22-6
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theory identifies physical instantiations of psychological properties, is distinct from 
the claim that it carries out reductions. A certain psychological property, can be 
instantiated in a variety of physical systems (all of them sharing a given structure in 
virtue of which they manifest the property), which have disparate physical 
properties; in that case, no reduction of the psychological to a physical type will be 
possible, except if we accept reduction to open disjunctions of physical types as 
genuine reduction. However, the instantiation laws that analyse systems possessing 
a given property, into individual components with a certain mode of organisation, 
do not describe mere correlations between properties and structures. They are laws 
and they are themselves derivable from nomic attributions, i.e. lawlike statements 
which attribute properties to the individual components of the organised system, in 
virtue of which the higher-level property is manifested in that particular system.
The above exposition of Cummins’ analysis of the explanatory role of property 
theories, is meant to put across the point that, in order to show that a certain 
property is causally relevant, it is not necessary to reduce it to one that features in a 
causal law. (Which is something that Davidson’s theory certainly does not allow) 
On the other hand, for an analysis of a given property in terms of its instantiations 
to be successful in bringing out the property’s causal relevance, more than mere 
statistical correlations are needed; in particular, an adequate theory must show the 
property’s relevance, in the light of nomic attributions and laws of instantiation that 
apply in the particular case.
So, given that property theories do not necessarily license reductions, could we 
say that Davidson’s theory might be developed along the lines of a functionalist 
position, as sketched out above, so that the causal relevance of intentional attitudes 
is justified? I believe that his arguments for the anomalism of the mental, insulate 
psychological terms (and hence action descriptions), not only from outright 
reduction to physical ones, but also from any lawful connection of the kind that a 
property theory would require if it was to have any explanatory value at all. In 
‘Mental Events’, he writes: ‘[TJhere may be true general statements relating the 
mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are 
not lawlike\ 38 Thus, it would be impossible, according to Davidson, to find any
38 in ‘EAE\ p.216
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genuinely lawful statement that would specify in virtue of what physical nomic 
attributes of the components of a certain type of structure, a given psychological 
property were instantiated.
Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of formulating genuine psychological or 
psychophysical laws stems from his conviction that the ascription of intentional 
attitudes and behaviour to agents, on which psychological explanations are based, 
is a process which is necessarily holistic, interpretative and normative. Its holism 
derives from the fact that we cannot ascribe beliefs, desires, expectations, etc., to 
agents, without taking into account their other past, present and future attitudes and 
behaviour. We have to make our ascriptions cohere with the pattern of the agent’s 
other attitudes.
But holism alone is not sufficient to differentiate Psychology from the Physical 
Sciences, since it is their feature too. What makes the difference is the 
interpretative and normative nature of the considerations on which these 
ascriptions are based. When we try to determine what a person’s attitudes and 
aims in behaviour are, we have to interpret their meaning, so that the holistic 
requirement is satisfied: ‘It is not merely, as with the measurement of length, that 
each case [of assignment of intentional attitudes] tests a theory and depends upon 
it, but that the content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in the 
pattern’.39 So, the special feature of psychological ascriptions is not merely that 
they are interdependent, but that they derive their content from the attitudes on 
which they depend. We interpret other people’s speech and behaviour so that they 
make sense against a background pattern of behaviour, which is verbal or 
otherwise. Our interpretation, moreover, has a normative character: We fix 
people’s attitudes, by constraining what they ought to believe, desire, etc. given 
this background pattern.
The interpretative, holistic and normative character of our inquiry into people’s 
attitudes and behaviour, derives from Psychology’s commitment to the 
‘constitutive ideal of rationality’. Although agents may be more or less rational, we 
must interpret them according to the set ‘ideal’ of rationality, basing our 
interpretation on what they ought to believe, desire etc., given our ascriptions of
39 ibid., p.221 (Emphasis and parenthesis mine).
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background attitudes. Otherwise, we can make no sense of their actions and self­
avowed attitudes. This commitment to the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’ is 
forced upon us if we are to treat men as rational agents and thinkers: ‘If we are 
intelligibly to attribute attitudes and beliefs, or usefully to describe motions as 
behaviour, then we are committed to finding, in the pattern of behaviour, belief and 
desire, a large degree of rationality and consistency.’40
So, what excludes the possibility of formulating lawful connections between the 
physical and the mental, is Psychology’s commitment to the ‘ideal of rationality’ 
which is an essential part of our concept of intention, belief, desire and action and 
cannot be compromised in the face of empirical evidence. The decision to treat 
men as ‘rational agents with goals and purposes and as subject to moral 
evaluation’41 , is a choice that does not allow us to let Psychology become a 
‘hostage to empirical fortune’. Hence, we cannot make an arbitrary choice of our 
scheme of interpretation (as we do with physical theories which are 
underdetermined by data), and establish lawlike connections between the mental 
and the physical, because that would leave the ‘ideal of rationality’ open to 
falsification by physical evidence: A law connecting mental predicates with 
physical ones, would have to be subject to empirical falsification, thus rendering 
psychological ascriptions of intentional attitudes sensitive to physical evidence. 
Hence, the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’ would lose its a priori status, which 
Davidson considers as an indispensable part of our commitment to ‘viewing men 
as rational agents’.
‘The constitutive force in the realm o f  behaviour derives from the need to view others, 
nearly enough, as like ourselves. As long as it is behaviour and not something else we 
want to explain and describe, we must warp the evidence to fit this frame. Physical 
concepts have different constitutive elements. Standing ready, as we must, to adjust 
psychological term s to one set o f  standards, and physical term s to another, we cannot 
insist on a sharp law-like connection between them ’42.
40 ‘Psychology as Philosophy’, EAE, p.237
41 ibid., p.239
42 Ibid. p.239.
41
It is not my purpose here to criticise Davidson’s arguments for the anomalism of 
the mental; my point is rather to show that, as Antony argues43, his scepticism 
regarding psychophysical laws does not concern only type-type reductionism, but 
any attempt to formulate nomic connections between the mental and the physical, 
connections that might make ascriptions of intentional attitudes subject to 
falsification by physical evidence. Evidence which is pertinent to physical laws and 
attributions, is not to be admitted to play any role in the process of interpretation of 
the agent’s behaviour. If it were admitted, that ‘would amount to changing the 
subject’,44 i.e. using non-mental descriptions to explain what we now characterise 
as intentional action.
It is now evident, I believe, that Davidson would not accept the possibility of 
lawfully connecting psychological properties to physical systems, as instantiation 
laws would require: ‘mental and physical predicates are not made for each other’.45 
A property theory that would explain how a pair of desire and belief cause, in 
virtue o f  their intentional properties, a piece of behaviour, would have to match up
in a law-like statement the property of having a desire to and the property of
having a belief that   with a certain mode of organisation of the physical
components of a system. Even if this instantiation law would not necessarily 
license a type-type reduction, it would nevertheless provide sufficient conditions, 
in physical terms, for these intentional properties to be instantiated. But that would 
compromise the (as proclaimed by Davidson) ‘a priori’ character of our ascriptions 
of intentionality, because it would make them liable to falsification by physical 
evidence: we would be in the position to tell, by examining the physical state of the 
brain, whether a certain belief or desire was instantiated, and hence it would be 
possible to overrule ascriptions based on rational considerations. This is something 
that, according to Davidson, cannot be allowed if we are to describe human 
behaviour in intentional terms, and thus view men as rational agents.
Therefore, I think that Davidson’s unified Theory of Mind and Action, does not 
have the resources to admit further explanation (and thus justification) of the 
causal relevance of reasons with respect to actions. His claim that singular action
43 op.cit. 174-83.
44 M.E., p.216.
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explanations are causal explanations, loses its plausibility in the face of his 
theory’s inability to provide grounds for justifying it. According to this theory, 
desires and beliefs are causes of actions, but it is impossible to ever come to know 
why did a particular reason cause a particular action. We may know that it did 
(since we may directly know that singular causation is at work even if we do not 
know the relevant description), but no further explanation could be possibly 
admitted. But this surely is not enough to ground Davidson’s causal condition. As 
Cummins’ discussion of scientific explanation will have made clear, in giving 
scientific explanations, we can normally do much better than cite the ‘producing 
cause’ of an event. The concept, and the actual practice of explanation, is much 
richer than Davidson allows it to be in the case of action.
VI.
Davidson proposed his Causal Theory of Action, as a theory that made sense of 
the difference between merely having a reason and acting, and acting because of it. 
The Causal Condition was supposed to account for the explanatory force of the 
'because' in reasons-explanations. But, as we have seen, the Causal Condition 
cannot confer additional explanatory force upon the reasons, since the assertion 
that the onset of a reason causally explains the action, cannot be grounded on any 
causal law, or any intentional property of the reason shown to be causal by an 
appropriate theory.
Hence, it must remain a mystery, in Davidson's theory, why a particular reason 
caused a particular action. The link between reason and action seems to be 
congruent with the link between physical events that take place in the brain, and 
'pure physical movements' of the body. It is prima facie natural to believe that, 
every time that an agent performs an action for a reason, there are physical events 
that start in her brain and end, through a chain of causal connections, in movement 
of some part of her body. The central problem in the Philosophy of Action, is to 
give an explanation of action that helps us understand how this congruence 
between rationalisation and event causation is possible. To combine, that is, in a 
harmonious and convincing way, the rational order of human behaviour that is
45 ibid. p.218.
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described and explained by the 'Human Sciences', with the natural order that is 
being charted with such success by the Physical Sciences. Davidson's theory fails 
to account for the problem of congruence, because it does not accept any kind of 
systematic correlation between mental and physical types. So, the fact that a 
particular reason caused a particular action is, in his theory, unexplainable. It is a 
brute fact: There is no connection to be found between the intentional kind that 
rationalises the action, and the physical kind that causally explains it.
Davidson might reply that the problem of congruence is only a pseudo-problem 
for him, since his theory is a monistic theory that takes the onsets of reasons to be 
identical to the physical events that are revealed as causes by physical science. 
Then, there is no congruence between the two connections (reasons-actions and 
neurochemical events-movement), because there are nc/two connections, but only 
one, involving two entities, and not four. Then, no explanation of why a particular 
reason caused a particular action is needed, because the reason is the physical 
event that features in the relevant causal law.
But this response does not take into account some of the real concerns that we 
have when we seek an action explanation. When we explain an event, we explain 
it under a description, and when two descriptions are equally true of it, it is not 
senseless to ask for an explanation of why this is so. This is attested to by any 
theory that does justice to the epistemic as well as metaphysical considerations 
pertaining to explanation. Davidson sometimes writes as if we can explain the 
'pure occurrence' of an event, without involving any of its characteristics in the 
explanation, i.e. as if we can explain why b, which happens to be F, occurred, 
without explaining why an F  event occurred. Such an explanation, if it makes 
sense at all, does not satisfy our original demand, which was for an account of a 
specific characteristic of the event in question, in the case of action, of its 
intentionality. If a Davidsonian action explanation is understood as an explanation 
of the 'pure occurrence' of an event, that happened to be an action, then the theory 
has failed its original purpose. The theory has to provide an explanation of why the 
physical movement examined has a certain property, namely o f being a so and so 
action. It should also provide us with a general account, of how it is possible for a 
given event, to have at the same time the property of being a so and so action, 
rationalised by a certain reason, and of being a certain physical movement, caused
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by a given physical event (the problem of congruence). A 'pure occurrence' 
explanation can do neither of the above, and so it fails as an action explanation.
If, on the other hand, Davidson's theory is supposed to provide 'property 
explanations', that is, explanations of the type 'why b is F , then it fails on the 
grounds that I provided earlier that the model proposed by the theory, cannot be 
justified as adequate: Reasons are unsupported as causes and hence, the necessity 
of the Causal Condition remains undemonstrated.
Finally, T. Nickles46, has observed that events that are described in mental 
terms, are not explainable on Davidson's theory, even if their particular identities 
with physical events, and the relevant strict causal laws are known. The reason is 
that, "no particular identity can take us, in an explanation-preserving way, from 
'Fb' to 'Gb', or from '(3!x) Mbx’ to '(3!x) Sbx’, not even the identity '(1 x) Mbx = ( 
ix) Sbx.'" Explaining why b is F, does not explain why c is G, even if we know 
that b=c. I think that this observation touches the heart of the problem that 
Davidson’s theory of action-explanation faces: It cannot give an explanatory 
account of properties, as opposed to 'pure occurrences' of events, because, having 
each foot on a different level of support, it cannot provide a unified, solid 
justification for the adequacy of its explanations.
Conclusion
It maybe the case that, on other grounds, Davidson's Causal Theory of Action 
and his Anomalous Monism, are deemed metaphysically plausible, but the 
problem that they face as theories of explanation, (in the limited domains of action 
and psychological explanation), suggests, I think, that they are infected at the 
metaphysical level too. Perhaps their ontology is too austere to capture the 
richness of ordinary psychological explanations, or their analysis of intentional 
concepts is simply off the mark. There have been many suggestions as to what is
46 See Nickles [1977].
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the problem in Davidson's metaphysics. F. Stoutland argues47 that the source of 
the problem in the Causal Theory of Action, is its identification of action with 
physical movement. We ascribe intentionality to bodily movements, says 
Stoutland, only insofar as we understand them as action. And to do this, we have 
to see the action in the light of reasons. Thus, there is some conceptual 
dependence between action and its reasons, that does not allow us to view them as 
separate entities, bearing the relation of cause and effect to each other. Hence, one 
cannot enquire about necessary conditions for a given physical movement being an 
action, since, we cannot even isolate a particular piece of behaviour without first 
understanding it as action. Hence, the understanding of action is prior to its 
explanation by reasons, and a theory that does not respect this priority, is bound to 
lead us into confusion. Von Wright’s theory, which I am going to consider in the 
second part, offers such an alternative understanding of action.
47 In Stoutland [1985].
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PART I I : THE INTENTIONALIST APPROACH
47
CHAPTER 4 : VON WRIGHT’S THEORY OF ACTION
Von Wright’s account of intentional action, expounded mainly in his book 
Explanation and Understanding48 and further articulated and defended in a 
number of subsequent publications49 does not amount to an analysis of action, 
as Davidson’s theory does. His theory is rather an attempt to set out the nature 
of the relations than hold between the concepts of intention, belief and 
intentional action, by discussing a theoretical schema, the Practical Inference 
schema that, according to him, provides the basis for the explanation, 
understanding and prediction of human action. In all that, the concepts of 
intention and intentional action are taken to be just as basic as that of event- 
causation50, and hence unanalysable in terms of it.
In this part of my thesis, I will try to present and assess the conceptual 
framework of intentional action as it is developed by von Wright, by first setting 
out the terms and the explanation schema used by the theory, and then by 
examining the nature of the conceptual connection between intention and action 
that is claimed, in von Wright’s theory, to be the basic explanatory relation. 
Finally, I will follow two different lines of criticism against von Wright’s 
intentionalist approach and assess their impact on it.
Preliminaries
Unlike the causal theory, von Wright’s model for action-explanation does not 
analyse action in terms of causation between events. The action that is standing
48 Von Wright [1971], (henceforth E&U).
49 See for example von Wright [1972], [1974], [1976], [1980].
50 In fact, von Wright understands the concept of event-causation as being dependent on that 
of action (see e.g. E&U Ch. II and von Wright[1974]), but his views on causation will not concern 
me here.
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in the explanandum sentence, cannot be identified with an event with a special 
type of causal theory. It is rather a piece of behaviour, which is already 
intentionalistically understood and which cannot be accounted for by using any 
other concepts.
However, the concept of action has some internal structure. The most 
important distinction in von Wright’s account, is that between the result and the 
consequence of an action. The result is that state of affairs or event which the 
agent intends to bring about by his behaviour.51 It is logically intrinsic to the 
action, since, in the case that it is not brought about, we cannot say that the 
agent has successfully performed the action under the description featured in his 
intention. What we can at most say, is that the agent tried but failed to perform 
it. Consider for example an action of mine, say throwing a brick towards a 
window. If my intention in throwing the brick towards the window is to break 
it, then the result of my action is the breaking of the window. If I fail to hit it, 
then I cannot be said to have performed an action of breaking a window, but a 
different one, e.g. that of throwing of a brick or of trying to break a window.
Most actions will also involve events that are either causes or effects of the 
result of the action, but which do not feature directly in the agent’s intention. 
Their occurrence is not a necessary condition for the successful performance of 
an action, because they are not intrinsic to it. The agent may or may not know 
about these causal antecedents and consequences of the result of his action and 
may or may not want them to materialise. This knowledge is of course very 
important in the ascription of moral responsibility, but is irrelevant to the 
present context. In our brick-throwing example, a consequence of my 
intentionally breaking a window may be that a certain person sleeping inside 
wakes up, or that a certain glass-maker gets richer. A causal antecedent of the 
result of my action may be the projectile of the brick, or my arm’s movement.
51 The result of an action does not need to be a change, since von Wright allows for 
preventive actions, where the agent prevents a change from taking place, and forbearances, where 
the agent forbears to do something which was in his power to do. In my discussion of von Wright’s 
theory, I will concentrate on productive actions, where the agent brings about some change through 
the movement o f his body.
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Note that the distinction between the result and consequence is relative to the 
agent’s intention: If all I intend by my behaviour is to throw a brick in the air, 
then the result of my act will be the projectile of the brick and the window 
breaking will be just a consequence. On the other hand, if my intention is to 
wake up the man sleeping inside the house, then his waking up will be the result 
of my act, and the window breaking and the brick throwing will be its causal 
antecedents. Using Davidson’s terms, we may say that by giving the result of an 
action, we are implying a description under which the action was intentional. 
However, it is important not to be mislead by this terminology. For von Wright, 
actions are not events that take on different descriptions. An action, is rather an 
instance of an agent’s bringing about an event . Hence actions are to be 
identified with the instances o f a relation that holds between agents and events, 
and not simply with the latter. So, when we speak of different descriptions of an 
action in the context of von Wright’s theory, we are really speaking of different 
actions.53
Von Wright also distinguishes between doing something intentionally and 
intending to do something. Whenever we do something that we intend to do, we 
do it intentionally. But it is not true that everything that we do intentionally, we 
intend or intended to do it. For example, when I intend to make myself a cup of 
coffee, I put water in the kettle, place it on the fire, remove it from the fire etc., 
and I do all these things intentionally, having the preparation of a cup of coffee 
as the object of my intention. But we cannot say that I intended to do all the 
things that I did intentionally. I may not even have had complete awareness of 
my actions.
According to von Wright, the concept of intentional action is more basic than 
that of non-intentional action. When we do things non-intentionally because of a 
mistake, or because of lack of knowledge, or by negligence, there is also an 
intentional action that we have performed. If, for example, I unintentionally 
wake up a person sleeping in his house, this is something I did by performing an 
intentional action, e.g. breaking his window with a brick. This priority given to
52 See von Wright [1963], pp.35-6.
53 See his reply to Donagan, in von Wright [1984], p. 810.
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intentional action is in accordance with Davidson’s view who, as we have seen, 
holds that non-intentional actions are just intentional ones under different 
descriptions. Although he accepts that non-intentional action is ‘parasitic’ upon 
intentional action, von Wright still allows for the existence of the former, in 
cases like laughing, yawning, etc. However, even these can be called actions 
only because we can learn how to do or omit to do intentionally54. If this were 
not the case, as happens for example with breathing, then we would not call 
them actions at all. Hence, all actions either involve something done 
intentionally by the agent, or something which can be performed or omitted 
intentionally55.
There is one more distinction that should be made, and this concerns the term 
behaviour. The term sometimes is used ambiguously by von W right. It may be 
meant as ‘intentionalistically understood’ or ‘action like’ behaviour, in which 
case it can feature in the explanandum sentence of a teleological explanation, 
because it is already understood as action and not as mere bodily movement. 
This last sense, i.e. behaviour as mere bodily behaviour (or movements), is what 
is meant by causal theorists when they analyse action in terms of a certain piece 
of behaviour caused by a certain type of mental event. Von Wright too 
sometimes means it in this sense. On my part, I will use ‘behaviour’ in a neutral, 
non-committal sense that may mean either ‘action like’ behaviour, or ’mere’ 
behaviour. If I want to talk of behaviour exclusively in one of these two senses, 
I will explicitly talk o f ‘action-like’ or ‘mere’ behaviour.
Finally, in my discussion of von Wright’s theory I will avoid, as I did with 
Davidson, entering into the problem of the individuation of action. For every 
would-be ‘action designator’, i.e. for every sentence purporting to designate an 
action, we can examine whether it really describes a piece of intentional acting 
on the part of the agent, leaving aside the question of how many actions are 
designated by act-designators that are somehow connected. In other words, for
54 See von Wright [1980], p. 18
55 In view of the priority given by von Wright to intentional, over non-intentional action, I 
will, from now on, use the term action to refer only to intentional action. If I want to talk about non- 
intentional action, I will make it explicit.
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every action-description given, we can discuss its intentionality without making 
any particular claims as to whether the descriptions we have are descriptions of 
a single act, or they are descriptions of distinct acts.
The Practical Inference Schema
After considering various versions of the third-person Practical Inference 
Schema (hereafter P.I.-schema), which he finds to be inadequate, von Wright 
arrives at the final formulation:
‘From now on A intends to bring about p at time t.
From now on A considers that, unless he does q no later than at time tf he cannot 
bring about p at time t.
Therefore, no later than when he thinks time t7has arrived, A sets him self to do q, 
unless he forgets about the time or is prevented.’56
The first thing to note here is that (as von Wright himself has pointed out57), 
the term ‘Practical Inference’ is a misnomer. With his P.I.- schema, he does not 
purport to provide an account of practical reasoning, as for example E. 
Anscombe has done. His aim is rather to unravel the structure of the concept of 
intentional action, by articulating a theoretical schema which he considers to 
play the central role in the explanation, understanding and prediction of human 
action. But he cannot, and does not claim that the Practical Inference presented 
here gives us a description of the actual process of deliberation of agents. So, 
many criticisms of the schema on the grounds that it does not depict accurately
f O
the process of rational deliberation , are beside the point, since this is not what 
the schema is supposed to do.
56 See E&U, p. 107.
57 See his reply to Anscombe, in von Wright [1984], p.821
58 For a criticism of this sort, with many interesting insights on practical reasoning, see 
Anscombe [1984].
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Von Wright’s aim is rather to set out an ‘ideal’ standard for the explanation, 
understanding and prediction of action, without discarding or reducing to 
something else the intentional concepts that are used in ordinary psychological 
descriptions and explanations. He regards the P.I. scheme as providing a model 
of complete, or ‘ideal’ explanation in the ‘Human’ Sciences, in roughly the 
same way as the Deductive-Nomological model serves as a paradigm of 
complete explanation in the ‘Natural’ Sciences. He writes:
‘Broadly speaking, what the subsumption-theoretic model is to causal explanation 
and explanation in the natural sciences, the practical syllogism is to teleological 
explanation in history and the social sciences’59.
The P.I.- schema, if ‘turned upside down’, becomes a schema for the 
teleological explanation of action, i.e. the conclusion becomes the explanandum 
and the premises become the explanantia. So, the fact that agent A did (or set 
herself to do) q, is explained in terms of her purpose to bring about p and her 
belief that q was the means to achieve this. The teleological explanation that 
emerges is intentionalistic in character, in the sense that it makes essential 
reference to the agent’s intentional attitudes. Hence, what matters in such an 
explanation, is not what the objective state of affairs is, but how it is seen to be 
by the agent. In that respect, it differs from ordinary teleological explanations 
that may be applicable to non-intentional systems.60.
A second important use of the P.I. schema is for the understanding of 
action. Since the explanandum of a teleological explanation is a piece of 
behaviour ‘intentionalistically understood’, it follows that the explanation of 
behaviour presupposes that we have first understood behaviour as action. In 
most normal cases, ‘we say off-hand of the way we see people behave that they
59 E&U, p.27
60 This point was made by Ch. Taylor in his book The Explanation o f  Behaviour: ‘We can 
thus see the lull extent of the difference between explanation by purpose and the type o f 
teleological explanation which would apply to our imaginary physical system. For in the former 
case the teleological account holds not of the organism in its «geographical» environment, but 
of the agent in his «intentional environment)), the environment as it is for him. Thus the notion of 
a centre of responsibility is integral to our account.’ (Ch. Taylor[1964], p.62.)
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perform such and such actions’61. These are actions that are familiar to us from 
our personal experience or from having observed other people perform them on 
past occasions. For these every-day actions, one does not normally need to 
interpret them by using a P.I. Von Wright’s contention is that, in these cases, we 
do not need to place an interpretation on something ‘neutral’ that we see: We 
are already ‘perceiving’ it as action. Only when we look for an explanation, i.e. 
for a further purpose in the action do we attempt to construct a P.I. But there are 
cases where we may doubt whether the behaviour that we see is intentional or 
not. Consider the example given by Stoutland:
‘ W e see an agent making some movements at a window. Is he doing anything 
intentionally? I f  so, what? At this point we cannot tell by seeing... Then we see he has 
a glass cutter. A  practical inference emerges:
He intends to get into the house.
He believes that he cannot get into the house unless he cuts a hole in the window.
62Therefore, he cuts a hole in the w indow’ .
In the example given, a P.I. guides our understanding the behaviour as action. 
We could not say off-hand whether he was doing anything intentionally or not. 
What we needed was to advance some plausible hypothesis as to what the 
possible aim in the behaviour might be. From the fact that a possible purpose in 
his behaviour emerged when we saw the glass cutter, we were able to 
understand the behaviour as intentional through the construction of a P.I. that 
could possibly explain his action. After having constructed it, we were able to 
‘see’ his movements as aiming at certain result, e.g. to cut a hole in the window 
without being seen. So the understanding of behaviour as action is the second 
use in which the P.I.-schema may be put.
The third use for the schema is that of the prediction of action. If we stand 
‘ex ante actu’, we can use the P.I.-schema in order to predict what the agent’s 
behaviour will be, provided that we know what her intentions and beliefs are. If 
we know that she intends to bring about p and that she thinks that unless she
61 von Wright [1972], p.32.
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does q, she will not achieve this, we can predict with varying degrees of 
reliability (depending on the particular circumstances and the reliability of the 
agent), that she will do q. The character of this kind of predictions will be 
discussed in the next chapters, where the nature of the connection between the 
premises and the conclusion of the P.I. is examined.
After considering various examples where the agent did not act according to 
her pre-formed intention and belief, von Wright arrived at the final formulation 
of the schema presented above, which he thought comes as close as possible to 
being logically conclusive. He introduced the parameter of time, in order to 
ensure that the agent keeps and remembers her intention up to the moment of 
action (if the inference is to apply to her), and added the ‘unless prevented’ 
clause, in order to exclude cases where factors beyond the agent’s control 
prevent her from carrying out (or initiating) her action. Now, von Wright seems 
to think that these qualifications are sufficient to ensure that the P.I. is applied 
only on ‘closed systems’, on systems, that is, where there is no outside 
interference that affects the relation between intention, belief and action. 
Whether he is right or not is a matter of dispute but it will not be of relevance 
here.
There are writers that have used the locution ‘normal conditions’ to group 
together all the specific circumstances that must hold for the P.I. to apply, e.g. 
the agent’s being able to do q, her knowing how to do it, the particular facts of 
the situation allowing her to do it, etc. I will not discuss what else should, or 
could be included under the heading ‘normal conditions’, taking for granted that 
some formulation where all the relevant factors are accounted for, is possible. In 
any case, I think that most of the clauses suggested by other writers, are already 
taken into account by von Wright, if only implicitly. For example, the agent’s 
belief that she knows how, and is able to, do the action q, is implied by her 
intention to do p and her belief that doing q is necessary for bringing about p64.
62 Stoutland [1984], p.313.
63 See e.g. Martin [1976],p.328. Also Churchland [1970], discusses the P.I. schema, (treating 
it as a law) and points to the considerations that might lead us to suspend application of the schema 
on a particular occasion.
64 See e.g. E&U, pp. 100-3.
55
Also the condition that the specific facts and circumstances of the situation 
must allow the agent to do q is, I think, implicit in the clause ‘unless prevented’. 
In any case, I will assume that the ‘normal conditions’ that must hold for the 
inference to be valid, can be filled in by some ideal theory.
Finally, a common criticism made against von Wright’s final formulation of 
the schema, is that it fails to take into account intentional explanations in terms 
of sufficient, rather than necessary means for a given end65. Von Wright thinks 
that, for the inference to be conclusive and for the teleogical explanation (which 
is just the ‘converse’ of a P.I.) to be complete, we must insist that the action q 
that the agent performed in order to bring about p, was thought by her necessary 
for p. Von Wright allows for cases where agents act on sufficient reasons but he 
thinks that these actions can be either explained as necessary for some further 
intention, or, if there is no such intention, their explanation must stay in a sense 
incomplete. If for example A thinks that she can bring about p by doing either q 
or s (either one of them is thought sufficient for p), and she does q say, then we 
can say either one of two things about her action. First, we may say that there 
was some criterion of choice for the agent (e.g. that q would save her time, 
effort, etc.) and hence, that her choice can be explained teleologically in terms 
of some further intention (e.g. to bring about p with the least effort possible). 
The explanation will now be a complete teleological explanation, based on a 
conclusive P.I.. Otherwise, if there was no consideration whatsoever favouring 
the choice of q over s, then we must say that the explanation of her doing q in 
terms of her intention to bring about p, is incomplete. Then, the only conclusion 
that will logically follow from the premises, will be that ‘the agent does q or s’, 
and no further explanation for her choice to do q will be possible. Von Wright 
does not deny that agents sometimes act in this manner, i.e. choose between 
competing means for a given end in a completely fortuitous way. He just thinks 
that these actions cannot be completely explained.
65 See e.g. Anscombe [1984] and von Wright’s reply, in von Wright [1984] pp.819-824.
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CHAPTER 5 : THE LOGICAL CONNECTION ARGUMENT
A First Version o f  the Logical Connection Argument
One of the most disputed issues in the Philosophy of Action, concerns the 
nature of the connection between the premises and the conclusion of a Practical 
Inference. Most ‘non-causalists’ have developed some version of the Logical 
Connection Argument, in order to prove that there is a logical relation between 
the volitional and cognitive attitudes that feature in the premises of the P.I. on 
the one hand, and the action that features in its conclusion on the other, and 
hence show that the mental attitudes mentioned cannot be causes of the action.
The Logical Connection Argument (hereafter L.C.A.), in its most general 
form, is based on two premises. The first premise is taken to be an 
uncontroversial element of the Humean view on causation, namely that causes 
are contingently related to their effects. The second premise asserts something 
which is taken to be part of our concept of intentional action: That the reasons 
which rationalise an action, are logically (non-contingently) related to it. The 
conclusion drawn by non-causalists, is that the causal theorists must hold 
inconsistently that the reason which explains an action is both contingently (i.e. 
causally) and non-contingently (i.e. logically) related to it. Therefore, the 
argument concludes, the Causal Theory must be wrong.66
The argument, in its original formulations67 attempts to establish that
/ o
between an intention (or act of volition) and its object, holds a type of logical
66 Each one of the two premises and the conclusion, as mentioned above, is in need o f some 
qualifications, which I will make for each particular version of the argument that I will examine.
67 By e.g. Melden in his ‘Free Action’. See Melden[1959],
68 Although Davidson initially did not think that intentions could be causes of actions, in 
view of the challenge presented by incontinent actions, he later came to recognise that they should 
be.(See his ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible? and ‘Intending’, in EAE and Davidson [1987]. 
See also Bishop [1989], Ch. 3 for an argument to the effect that Davidson needs to accept them as
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connection which Stoutland calls ‘weak’ type69. The weak type of logical 
connection between the intention and its object, consists in the fact that the only 
way there is to ‘see’ an intention, is to ‘see’ its object. In other words, the only 
way one can intrinsically describe and identify an intention, is by saying what it 
is an intention of.
The argument in this form has been shown to be inadequate by several 
philosophers.70 Stoutland argues convincingly that Melden’s defence of the 
L.C.A. does not go beyond establishing a weak type of logical connection 
between intention and its object, and hence that it fails to prove the untenability 
of the causal theorist’s position. It is true that a plausible causal theory must 
accept that the intention has no intrinsic feature apart from its content, and 
therefore, that it is logically related to its object in the weak sense: A theory of 
intention that characterises intention in terms of some ‘inner’ impression left on 
the agent, and recognised by him through introspection, is logically possible, but 
extremely implausible, and thus it would not provide a sound basis for the 
establishment of a viable Causal Theory of Action. Therefore, the causal 
theorist must agree that intentions bear the weak type of logical connection to 
their objects. But it does not follow from this that the causal relation is 
excluded. It can still be a contingent fact that my ‘intention to q’ results in q, 
even if the only way we can characterise it is by referring to its object. The 
existence of the weak type of logical relation is compatible with the occurrence 
of the intention being a (contingent) cause of the occurrence of its fulfilment, 
i.e. its object. So, the existence of the weak type of logical relation, does not rule 
out the possibility that a causal relation also connects the events corresponding 
to the occurrence of the intention and its object. Since the proponents of this 
early version of the L.C.A. did not go beyond the establishment of the weak 
connection, their argument does not have any force against the Causal Theory of 
Action.
causes). In view of this, recognised by Davidson, need, I will construe the LCA as an argument 
against the possibility of intentions, rather than desires, being causes of actions.
69 See Stoutland [1970], pp. 120-2
70 Most influential has been the rebuttal by Davidson in ARC..
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Von Wright’s Verifiability Argument
I.
Von Wright agrees that the establishment of the weak type of logical 
connection is compatible with the occurrence of the intention being a cause of 
the occurrence of the act71; yet, he still thinks that there is some sort of logical 
dependence between intention and action, a dependence that rules out the 
possibility of a theory which construes intentions as Humean causes of action. 
This ‘non-causal’ intuition is expressed much more convincingly through a 
complete theory of action such as von Wright’s. The L.C.A. argued from the 
standpoint of a complete theory can be brought to bear on the causal theory 
more forcefully than any purely ‘negative’ argument. So, in his version of the 
L.C.A., the practical syllogism which is the basic schema for the explanation of 
action, plays the central role.
The way he tries to establish this logical dependence, is by means of the
77‘verifiability argument’. This is an argument that has been criticised for being 
either circular or inconclusive by some of his critics; even von Wright’s own 
position regarding its conclusiveness has wavered on a number of occasions. 
Prima facie, it seems that von Wright attempts to prove that there is a logical 
dependence between the singular propositions that serve as premises in the P.I.- 
schema (taken as a conjunction), and the proposition that serves as conclusion. 
To do that, he has to show that at least one combination of truth-value 
assignments to the propositions, is not logically possible. That is, he takes as a 
sufficient condition for the logical dependence, that at least one of the 
conjunctions p&q, ~p&q, ~p&~q, p&~q is a contradiction (where p is the 
conjunction of the propositions that serve as premises). He tries to show that 
this condition is satisfied in the P.I., by arguing that the premises and the 
conclusion cannot be verified independently from each other, and using the 
additional assumption that for two propositions to be logically independent, it
71 See E&U, p.94.
72 The argument is found in E&U, p.94fF.
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must be possible to verify or falsify each one independently of the other. It 
should be stressed here that von Wright is talking about the logical possibility of 
verifying or falsifying the propositions in question, and not about the factual or 
pragmatic possibility that depends on our epistemic capacities74.
II.
The first part of the argument considers the problem of the verification of the 
conclusion of a given P.I.: How can we establish that the conclusion ‘A does 
q’75, of a practical syllogism which serves as the basis of a provisional
7explanation , is true? Von Wright points out that, in order to do this, it will not 
be enough to establish that the result of the action attributed to A has 
materialised, even if we can assert it came about as an effect of A’s bodily 
movements. These movements, will constitute an action on the part of A, only if 
there is a further aim which the agent wants to achieve by performing them. 
Hence, to verify that ‘A does a’, we need to consider various purposes and 
beliefs that the agent may have, which are in accordance with the behavioural 
manifestations that we observe. In other words, to verify the conclusion of a
73 See e.g. Tuomela [1977] pp. 185-91 and Martin [1976].
74Still, even if one sees the verifiability or falsifiability of the propositions in the above sense, 
von Wright’s assumption is questionable. As Tuomela (op.cit. p. 185) observes, two propositions in 
the context of a scientific theory may not be independently verifiable, but still have the required 
independence. I will set aside this problem and go along with von Wright’s assumption, since, in 
any case, as I will try to argue subsequently, his argument does not prove the mutual dependence of 
verifiability, and therefore the assumption is not, after all, crucial.
75 For the purpose of simplicity I will ignore the complication presented by the inclusion of 
the time factor and the ‘unless prevented’ clause in the conclusion, and assume that, with respect to 
them, ‘normal conditions’ prevail. This simplification will not affect the exposition o f von Wright’s 
main point.
76 In von Wright’s own discussion, it is not clear whether he is talking about the verification 
of the conclusion of some P.I. which is offered as a provisional explanation, or whether his 
argument concerns the verification of an ascription of intentional ity to a piece of behaviour, without 
having any particular P.I. at hand with which to explain it. I think that we have to understand him 
as talking about the conclusion of a given P.I. which is offered as a hypothesis for the explanation o f 
an action. If there is no particular inference to examine, then we do not have any specific premises 
and conclusion between which to establish the logical connection.
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certain P.I., we need to construct different practical syllogisms which share the 
same conclusion with our provisional inference, and verify the premises of any 
one of them.
Consider for example the problem of verifying the proposition ‘A opens the 
door’, for which a provisional explanation in terms of A’s intention to let X out 
of the room is offered. We can establish that A’s behaviour is an intentional 
action on his part, only by establishing that the premises of some P.I. with 
conclusion ‘A opens the door’, are true. We may for example, construct a 
hypothetical explanation, which ascribes to A the intention to let Y into the 
room, and the belief that he could achieve this by opening the door. Then, the 
verification of the conclusion of our P.I., will depend on the possibility of 
verifying either one of the conjectured ascriptions, i.e. either that A intends to 
let X out, or that he intends to let Y in (or indeed, any other premises that 
conclude in ‘A does a’). Hence, the ‘burden of verification is shifted from the 
verification of the conclusion to that of the premises of a practical inference.’77
It may be objected here that normally we do not need to verify the intention 
with which one acts, in order to establish that his behaviour constitutes 
intentional action, rather than ‘mere movements’. For example, we usually 
know that an agent (intentionally) opens a door, just by seeing his movements; 
we do not need to establish what is the intention ‘behind’ his behaviour. This 
intuition is apparently shared by von Wright himself, since elsewhere he 
remarks: ‘In the normal cases, we say off-hand of the way we see people behave 
that they perform such and such actions- raise their arms, walk or run, open key­
locks or hand things over to one another’.78 However, these cases can still be 
covered by von Wright’s argument, if he claims that our warrant for ‘saying off­
hand’ that the behaviour we observe is intentional, is that we already have some 
idea of the intentions that may possibly lie ‘behind’ it. Hence, we may be able to 
tell from direct observation that a piece of behaviour is intentional, but this is 
only because we implicitly assume that there is a further aim and a belief
77 E&U, p. 109.
78 von Wright [1972], p.32
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involved.79 The ultimate verification of our ascription, would then be again 
dependent on the verification of the premises of one of the practical syllogisms 
we are implicitly assuming to hold in this case.
Thus, in the first part of the argument, von Wright tries to show that the 
verification of some P.I. is a necessary condition for the verification of any 
ascription of intentionality to behaviour. But, does he want to argue that it is 
also a sufficient condition? This is the question that the second part of the 
argument deals with.
With it, von Wright tries to establish that the verification of the premises of 
the P.I., depends on the verification of the conclusion. One possible way that we 
might attempt to corroborate a hypothesis concerning the agent’s motivational 
structure (i.e. his intention and means/end belief), is negatively : If the agent 
really intends to bring about p, then he will not, until he fulfils his intention (at 
the time specified by the premises), embark upon an action which he thinks is 
incompatible with p. If, for example, A intends to go to the theatre tomorrow 
evening, then he should not book tickets for a film that is on show at the same 
time as the theatre performance. If he did that, then we would be justified to 
doubt whether he really had the intention to go to the theatre, or whether he held 
the right beliefs about e.g. the time of the performances. This way of falsifying 
the premises, relies on our ability to construct a practical syllogism that will 
show that A’s booking of the cinema tickets was intentional and, if so, under 
what description and with what beliefs. It is not possible to overturn the original 
ascription of intention just by looking at the results of A’s actions. We have to 
see the aims and the beliefs that are present, and to do that we have to construct 
practical syllogisms that explain his actions as intentional. Therefore, this 
indirect, ‘negative’ way to verify or falsify a putative ascription of intention still 
depends on the verification of other intentions and intentional actions.
Other possible methods we might use to establish the truth of the premises of 
some practical syllogism, are by appealing to the agent’s character and to
79 That this is the position that von Wright himself would take, is suggested by the following 
phrase, quoted from the same passage as in fn.61: ‘We are further acquainted with innumerable ends 
for the sake of which these actions may be performed’.
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regularities in his behaviour, considering his educational and cultural 
background, or taking into account his own self-avowals. Von Wright tries to 
emphasise that all these indirect ways that help us establish our hypothesis, 
necessarily involve appeal to the agent’s intentions and actions, and hence are 
themselves based on the interpretative pattern laid out by the P.I.. There is no 
more direct way of establishing the truth of a given set of premises of a P.I., 
than by looking at the agent’s behaviour and his attitudes through other practical 
syllogisms.
Consider for example the method of appealing to regularities in the agent’s 
behaviour. The knowledge of these regularities is, according to von Wright, also 
based on our intentionalistic understanding of the agent’s actions on past 
occasions: Having interpreted his behaviour through a practical syllogism on 
previous cases, we extrapolate to the present case and make our ascriptions 
accordingly. Regularities do not take us beyond the agent’s behaviour as it is 
understood through the P.I. schema. Therefore, von Wright claims that it is not 
possible to appeal to regularities, analogies, character traits, etc. as direct 
evidence for the existence of a certain intention, because they are also based on 
intentionalistic, and hence indirect, understanding of the agent’s behaviour.
Even the agent’s self-avowals may not be considered as direct ways of 
establishing some attitude-ascription, for they, as well, have to be interpreted by 
using the P.I. schema. In order to use the agent’s declarations (which themselves 
constitute verbal behaviour ) as a basis for grounding our hypothesis, we need 
to understand them as intentional action and explain it in terms of his intentions 
and beliefs. He may, for example, be lying, or he may be misunderstanding his 
situation or the meaning of our questions. Again, this kind of verificational 
procedure provides no more direct evidence for the truth or falsity of our 
hypothetical premises, than any other appeal to his intentional behaviour.
The point that, as I understand him, von Wright tries to make in the second 
part of his argument, is that we cannot have direct access to the agent’s 
intentions and beliefs, by somehow getting direct access to his inner states, or by 
considering some other piece of objective evidence such as ‘non-
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intentionalistically’ understood behaviour. Of course, this is not a claim about 
our actual scientific or epistemic capacity, but a claim about the logical structure 
of the concepts of intention and intentional action. The only way we can find 
evidence for the truth of a certain intention/belief ascription, is by investigating 
the agent’s behaviour as this is mediated by further actions, intentions, beliefs 
and so on. The intentionality of behaviour is not located at some inner state of 
the agent, that comes into being at a certain time before the action and somehow 
(causally or otherwise) brings about the intended result. It has to be established 
by understanding what is the aim in the agent’s behaviour, and this cannot be 
done by looking for special kinds of ‘inner states’ behind the behaviour, but by 
using the P.I. schema to interpret it, whether it is verbal or otherwise.
III.
The problem that von Wright started with, was to establish that a certain 
ascription of an intention and belief to the agent was true, but in all of the 
verificational procedures that he considered, there was no direct evidence to be 
found. All of these indirect methods can be helpful, but they are still fallible and 
provisional, taking us no further than the agent’s intentions and actions. The 
question is then, whether he should take these indirect methods of verification 
as acceptable for the establishment of the premises of the P.I., or whether he 
should say that the only conclusive evidence for them, is that the conclusion of 
the P.I. be true, i.e. that the action described there is performed. Is the ultimate 
evidence for the truth of a certain volitional and cognitive attitude ascription to 
the agent, that he acts accordingly? It seems that, unless such a position is 
taken, the verifiability argument will be inconclusive as an argument for the 
logical dependence between the premises and the conclusion of the P.I. schema. 
For, if von Wright accepts as conclusive evidence the agent’s self-avowals, or 
his past actions and intentions (which are plausible candidates), then it seems 
that the propositions serving as premises of the practical syllogism under 
consideration will be verifiable independently of the proposition serving as 
conclusion, and hence that the argument cannot go through.
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As Martin80 and Tuomela81 have correctly pointed out, to take such a 
position amounts to assuming that a logical relation exists. In that case, the 
argument becomes circular. If von Wright claims that the only factor that would 
ultimately decide the falsehood of the premises is the non-instantiation of the 
conclusion, then he is begging the question, since he is simply presupposing that 
a logical entailment exists, which is what he set out to prove in the first place. 
Von Wright’s argument, if interpreted this way, cannot be considered as proving 
the logical connection between premises and conclusion from the impossibility 
of their independent verification, because in order to establish the latter claim, it 
simply presupposes the former.
IV.
Therefore, von Wright would be caught in a circle if he took the instantiation 
of the action, as described in the conclusion of the P.I., to be the only conclusive 
evidence for the truth of the premises and so, the verifiability argument would 
have no force against the Causal Theories. Nevertheless, we can see his 
discussion of the verifiability argument as an attempt to demonstrate the 
conceptual dependence between the premises and the conclusion of the P.I., 
rather than as an argument to exclude the causal connection by establishing that 
a logical entailment holds. This interpretation is strongly suggested, I believe, by 
von Wright’s discussion of the ‘tyrant example’, which concludes the exposition 
of the verifiability argument. R. Martin82 argues that this example is used as a 
means to apply ‘logical pressure’ to the preceding argument, to confine, that is, 
its domain of application within the limits where the conceptual connection 
indeed holds.
Under this interpretation, the argument for the mutual dependence of the 
verification of premises and the verification of conclusions in practical
80 See Martin [1976], p.336-7
81 See Tuomela [1977], p. 185
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syllogisms, would be seen as an attempt to elucidate our concepts of intention 
and intentional action which, according to von Wright, are such that their 
explanatory connection is based on a conceptual, rather than a contingent 
dependence. As he observes at the end of his discussion of the verifiability 
argument: ‘It is a characteristic of these verificational procedures, that they 
presuppose the existence of some factual behaviour, upon which an
o - j
intentionalist ‘’interpretation” is then put’ . This phrase confines, as it were, 
the domain where the conceptual dependence holds. Once we have a piece of 
‘factual behaviour’, we are forced to understand and explain it in terms of some 
practical syllogism, if we are to see it as action at all. And in our effort to see it 
as such, no other considerations apart from the ones pertaining to practical 
syllogisms could help us. For example, there can (logically) be no direct, 
empirical evidence for the agent’s intentions and actions, separate from their 
intentionalistic understanding, that would help us decide between our putative 
explanations. So, if the presupposition holds (i.e. we have a piece of factual 
behaviour on which to apply our explanation), the action featuring in the 
explanandum is conceptually tied to the premises and it is in virtue of this tie 
that the premises explain the conclusion. The verifiability argument shows that 
no other considerations are relevant.
But, assume that we lift the presupposition that some ‘factual behaviour’ is 
there. ‘What does this assumption amount to?’, is the question that prompts von 
Wright to his discussion of the ‘tyrant example’. In this philosophical ‘thought 
experiment’, we are invited to imagine a case where, all the premises of the P.I. 
are true by hypothesis, but there is no ‘factual behaviour’ on the part of the 
agent upon which to place our interpretation. The specific example given is that 
of a would-be assassin who is resolved to shoot a tyrant. We are assuming that 
he has formed the relevant intention and means/end belief, and that all the 
‘normal conditions’ prevail. But, when the time has come to shoot, without 
having forgotten his intention, he does not shoot, but instead he stands there
82 See Martin op. cit., p.338-9
83 E&U, p.l 16
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with no relevant behavioural signs whatsoever84. After using every possible 
method of investigation into the case, including medical examination, there are 
still no signs that show that he changed, or forgot his intention, or that he was 
prevented by some physical (e.g. paralysis), or psychological (e.g. fear) factor. 
Assuming then that we have no grounds at all for denying the premises of the 
P.I., such a case would be a counterexample to the logical entailment thesis, 
since we have the premises being instantiated as true and the conclusion as 
false.
The question raised by von Wright is whether we should deny, after all, the 
truth of the premises, thus turning the conclusion into the ultimate criterion for 
their truth or falsehood. An affirmative answer, von Wright says, would mean 
that we have turned ‘the validity of the practical syllogism into a standard for
Of
interpreting the situation’ . It would mean, in other words, that the validity (i.e. 
the logical conclusiveness) of the P.I. was assumed, in order to show that 
premises and conclusion are not independently verifiable.
V.
Von Wright himself does not opt for the affirmative answer to the question
raised above. He says that, ‘there is no logical compulsion here if this sort of
case can be imagined, it shows that the conclusion of a practical inference does 
not follow with logical necessity from the premises. To insist that it does would 
be dogmatism’86. Hence, his conclusion appears to be that the premises of the 
P.I. do not logically necessitate the occurrence of an action that matches them. 
But he goes on to distinguish between the ‘prospective’ and the ‘retrospective’ 
uses of the schema. In its prospective use, the schema is applied for the purpose
84 It is important that he does not appear to be forbearing to act, either, for if he were he 
would be performing a relevant to the situation action (since forbearances are acts for von Wright) 
on which we could place a new interpretation. That this is so, we can imagine that it is established 
by questioning him, or physiologically examining him.
85 E&U, p.l 17
86 ibid., p.l 17
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of prediction of action and, as the ‘tyrant example’ shows, in this case we 
cannot say that the premises entail the conclusion. But in the retrospective use, 
where the schema is applied for the purpose of explaining a piece of ‘factual 
behaviour’ which is already there, von Wright sees a logical entailment between 
the premises and the conclusion. This necessity, is necessity ‘conceived ex post 
actu,87, he writes.
His contention that, in its ‘ex post actu’ use, the P.I. is logically conclusive, 
has been, for good reasons, much criticised. To say that in the retrospective use 
of the schema, if the premises were true, then ‘the action was logically bound to
o o
happen’, cannot mean, as Malcolm correctly points out, that the fact that the 
agent acted is included as a premise in the P.I.. For if it meant that, then the 
conclusion would indeed follow from the premises, but it would follow trivially. 
The fact that the action has taken place, cannot alter the logic of the inference. 
Since von Wright admits that in the prospective case, the truth of the premises 
does not entail that the behaviour will occur, he has to concede also that there is 
no logical entailment involved, whether we stand ‘ex ante’ or ‘ex post actu’.89
Von Wright’s idea of necessity conceived ‘ex post actu’ is therefore 
untenable, if understood as an attempt to establish that a logical entailment, 
which excludes the possibility of a causal connection, holds between 
intention/belief and action in the retrospective use of the P.I. schema. However, 
in the writings that followed ‘Explanation and Understanding’, and ‘On so 
called Practical Inference’ (in which he still defended the idea of ‘ex post actu’ 
necessity), von Wright apparently accepted the criticisms raised by Malcolm 
and others and tried to modify his position. So, for example, in his reply to 
Malcolm, he wrote that ‘the idea to the effect that the practical inference is
87 ibid. P.l 17
88 See Malcolm op.cit., p.358
89 Rex Martin makes the same point in (op. cit., p.341): ‘Either we have a logical entailment 
between the two parts of the inference schema, or we don’t:...And if [the premises]...do not logically 
entail [the conclusion]...then adding the [ex post actu]...stipulation, makes no difference.’ (My 
brackets).
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conclusive only ex post actu is obscure.’90 Still, as is the case with all non-
causalists, von Wright maintained his intuition that the L.C.A. is substantially 
right. Nevertheless, I do not think that there is any clear, modified statement of 
the argument that might prove his case, in his later writings. There are, however, 
some illuminating remarks made by von Wright there, that might help us 
establish some sort of coherent version of the Logical Connection thesis that can 
be used against the Causal Theory.
As I have argued above, von Wright’s discussion of the Verifiability 
Argument, is best seen as an elucidation of the considerations that we take into 
account when we are trying to establish the truth of an explanation (or 
prediction) of an intentional action, within the conceptual framework set out by 
the P.I. schema. The ‘tyrant example’ shows what the limits of this framework 
are. The fact that we can imagine a case like that and accept it as a logical 
possibility, means that the premises of the P.I. do not logically necessitate the 
occurrence of the action described in the conclusion. And this is true, 
irrespectively of whether the action has taken place or not. But, within our 
conceptual framework of action- explanations, accepting the truth of the 
premises, ‘forces’ us to accept the conclusion as well. If we do not, then the 
framework collapses and we can no longer apply its concepts to agents who do 
not act according to their (verified) intentions and beliefs.
Consider the example of the would-be assassin. The fact that he fails to act, 
is completely unintelligible to anyone who wishes to employ the notions of 
intention, belief and action, as they are accommodated within the conceptual 
framework set out by the P.I. schema. As Malcolm points out, ‘if his 
inexplicable non-performances were other than extremely rare...[then]...we 
could no longer apply the concept of intention to that person’.91 On the other 
hand, when agents act according to their intentions and beliefs, then their 
actions can be completely explained by means of the practical syllogism. No 
other kind of consideration (as von Wright has argued in his discussion of the
90 See von Wright [1984], reply to Malcolm, p.815
91 Malcolm op.cit., p.364 (My brackets)
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verification procedures) would help us understand any better their actions, since 
whatever further attitudes or behaviour we ascribe to the agent, we do so only 
through the mediation of practical syllogisms.
The claim then, that can (or should) be defended by von Wright, is that there 
is a conceptual link that holds between the premises and the conclusion of the 
P.I. and this link can adequately provide for complete explanations of actions in 
terms of reasons, as long as we keep within the confines of our conceptual 
framework. Malcolm calls this conceptual relation ‘semi-entailment’. The term 
is in need of clarification, and here von Wright’s remarks might help us: In his 
reply to Malcolm’s criticism, he characterises this bond of ‘semi-entailment’ 
between premises and conclusion of the practical syllogism, as ‘partly a 
condition of the intelligibility of the action, and partly a condition of the 
applicability of the concept of intention’.
It is a condition of the intelligibility of the action because, unless the action 
featured in the conclusion follows from the premises, we cannot understand it as 
action at all. Having accepted the P.I.-schema as the basis for the explanation of 
action, it would be impossible to understand how it could be the case that, for an 
agent, the premises were instantiated as true, but the action described in the 
conclusion did not follow. This possibility cannot be ruled out on logical 
grounds, but it would have to be considered as a case falling outside our 
conceptual framework, and thus as completely unintelligible, given the concept 
of intention that we actually have. On the other hand, the bond of semi- 
entailment is a condition for the applicability of our concept of intention since, 
as Malcolm writes, ‘we do not ascribe to a person the intention to do a certain 
thing unless we expect him to do this’. We would not even be able to apply 
the practical syllogism to agents, if their behaviour (or non-behaviour as in the 
case of the would-be assassin) could not be explained by it. But we do apply this 
scheme (or so von Wright argues), and we often base our predictions about 
human behaviour on it, not expecting to come across cases like that of the
92 In von Wright [1984], p.817
93 In Malcolm [1984], p.364
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‘tyrant example’. Moreover, if we do come across one of these ‘non-explicable 
non-performances’, we resort to the solution of denying that all the ‘normal 
conditions’ prevail, rather than accept that it is genuinely inexplicable.
So, in the light of the above qualifications, we can see, I think, von Wright’s 
discussion of the mutual dependence of the verification of our ascriptions of 
intention and belief and action, as the spelling out of the implications that 
follow from our commitment to the P.I.-schema, as the basic schema for the 
explanation, understanding and prediction of intentional behaviour. These 
implications stem from the conceptual connection that ties intention to action, 
and mean that there can be no direct, independent from the practical syllogism, 
verification of our attitude ascriptions. To find the intentionality in the 
behaviour, we always have to look through the ‘glasses’ of practical syllogisms.
The Relevance o f  the Verifiability Argument
I.
But can von Wright’s arguments, if construed as suggested above, have any 
force against the possibility of a Causal Theory of Action? It is a common and 
well-defended thesis of causalists that no argument supporting the conceptual 
dependence between reasons and actions, can rule out the possibility of the 
events instantiating the former being causes of the events instantiating the latter. 
This view is summarised in the following quotation by J.L. Mackie: ‘No 
problems about independent verification can undermine this possibility of 
independent existence [of intentions and actions]’.94
W.D. Gean95, has advanced this claim further by arguing that not even an 
entailment relation between reasons and actions, can exclude the possibility of a 
Humean causal connection holding between the corresponding events (seen as 
particulars). Gean accepts that ‘if two events have a logical connection, then
94 Mackie [1974], p.292 (My brackets).
95 Gean [1975]
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they do not also have a causal connection’96. Hence, if we can establish the 
antecedent in the case of intentions and actions, then we will have shown that 
the former cannot be (part of) the Humean cause of the latter. But, Gean argues 
that there is no version of the L.C.A., among the ones proposed, that establishes 
such a connection. At most, what they have shown, is that there is a logical 
relation between propositions referring to the events involved, not between the 
events themselves. Since the causal relation holds between events and not 
propositions, the L.C.A. cannot exclude it from the analysis of action.
Consider for example Stoutland’s strong type of logical connection, which is 
defined as follows:
‘Two events, A and B, bear the strong type o f  logical connection to each other, if  it 
is a priori true that when A occurs, B occurs. A and B, for example, bear the strong 
type o f  logical connection if  the proposition, ‘’If  A, then B ,”  is logically true.’97
This definition seems ambiguous in a certain respect, since Stoutland 
presents it as concerning two events, rather than propositions. But, from the way 
he constructs the definiens, it is clear, I think, that the only interpretations that 
we can place on this kind of necessity, are either the ‘entailment’, or the ‘de 
dicto’ interpretations. According to the entailment interpretation suggested by 
Gean, the statement that A and B bear the strong type of logical connection to 
each other, should be read as follows:
(1): ‘Event A occurs’ entails ‘Event B occurs’.
Gean argues that the necessity involved, if interpreted as above, is 
compatible with event A being a causal condition of event B. This causal 
statement should be read as follows:
(2): ‘Event A is a causal condition of event B’
96 ibid., p.349
97 Stoutland [1970], p.l 19
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Statement (1) does not entail the falsehood of (2), since (1) only tells us that 
a certain proposition entails another, whereas (2) tells us that a certain event is 
the cause of another event.
The second interpretation that could be placed upon Stoutland’s strong type 
of logical connection, is the ‘de dicto’ interpretation. According to it, the logical 
relation involved should be understood as follows:
(3): ‘If A occurs, then B occurs’ is necessarily true.
Here, the necessity asserted is that of the truth o f  a proposition, not of any 
relation between the particular events A and B. So, according to Gean, (3) is, 
like (1), compatible with the truth of (2), and hence ‘de dicto’ necessity does not 
rule out a causal dependence.
Gean argues that, the fact that the anti-causalist proponents of the L.C.A. talk 
about logical connections holding between events only under certain 
descriptions, amounts to an implicit acceptance, on their part, that the 
connections in question concern propositions, not events seen as particulars. If 
those connections held between the events, then we should be able to substitute 
in them, salva veritate, any true descriptions of the intentions, beliefs and 
actions featured, as is the case for the causal connection. This is admittedly not 
possible, since it is widely accepted that intentions and beliefs rationalise (and 
hence are logically connected to) the actions, only under certain descriptions. 
So, Gean concludes, either a ‘de dicto’ or an ‘entailment’ interpretation must be 
accepted for the necessity argued for by anti-causalists; but such a necessity 
does not exclude a causal connection. According to Gean, only a statement of 
‘de re’ necessity would suffice to rule out the causal connection. Such a ‘de re’ 
interpretation, could possibly be expressed as follows:
(4): There is an event A and an event B, and these events are such that, 
necessarily, if A occurs, then B occurs.
A ‘de re’ statement of logical necessity such as the above, would make sure 
that the logical connection held between the events themselves and not between
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propositions referring to them. ‘De re’ necessity, is therefore incompatible with
(2), if the Humean principle of the contingency of causal connections is 
accepted. But, as Gean points out, even if we disregard the fact that the 
intelligibility of such statements is a matter of dispute, the anti-causalists have 
offered no support for the thesis that the connection between the intention and 
action, is ‘de re’ necessary. So, he concludes, the L.C.A. as it is expressed by its 
proponents, does not have any force against the Causal Theory of Action.
II.
Gean’s objections against the L.C.A., would appear to be especially telling 
against von Wright’s anti-causal arguments. After all, von Wright has tried to 
establish a logical connection between the premises and the conclusion of the 
practical syllogism, between propositions, that is, and not events. So, even if he 
could establish a strict entailment between premises and conclusion, Gean’s 
arguments would appear to overturn his anti-causal conclusion. Of course, von 
Wright cannot possibly claim that there is such a thing as a ‘de re’ necessity 
holding between intention and action, and being such that the occurrence of the 
intention is an entity which in itself, logically necessitates the occurrence of the 
result of the action. Such an entity does not exist since, as Mackie correctly 
observes: ‘Hume’s arguments exclude this from reality, not merely from our 
concept of efficient causation.’98
A first point that can be made in defence of von Wright’s theory and against 
Gean’s arguments, is that they presuppose a theory of events which is not by any 
means indisputable and which, in any case, is not shared by von Wright. But, 
setting this objection aside, we could say that Gean’s arguments cannot even be 
applied to von Wright’s Logical Connection thesis, because for von Wright, 
intentions, and reasons in general, are not events at all. Hence, he is not 
committed to showing that the logical connection in question is a ‘de re’ 
necessary connection which holds between events. Therefore, Gean’s
98 In Mackie op.cit., p.295
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arguments, if used against von Wright, are question begging, since they rest on 
the assumption that for every reason that rationalises an action, there 
corresponds an event. Von Wright of course denies this. The intention of an 
action cannot be located at some mental state, process or event. It is rather the 
direction, or meaning given to behaviour by the agent. In a much quoted extract 
from ‘Explanation and Understanding’, he writes:
‘One could say - but this too might be m isleading - that the behaviour’s 
intentionality is its place in a story about the agent. Behaviour gets its intentional 
character from being seen by the agent him self or by an outside observer in a w ider 
perspective, from being set in a  context o f  aims and conditions’."
Hence, Gean’s ‘de re’/ ’de dicto’ distinction cannot be applied to von 
Wright’s arguments, in order to undermine his conclusions. But, by the same 
token, one could say that von Wright’s thesis that intentions cannot be construed 
as separate occurrences from the behaviour they lead to, is question-begging in 
its own right against the Causal Theory of Action and therefore, his version of 
the L.C.A. cannot prove the Causal Theory wrong. Thus, Gean’s argument is 
successful in showing that not even the establishment of an entailment relation 
can exclude reasons (seen as particular occurrences) from being among the 
causes of actions, unless the nature of reasons is prejudged in favour of von 
Wright’s ‘conceptualistic’ theory. I think that this is exactly right , and this is 
why I contend that von Wright’s attempt to establish the L.C.A., if seen as an 
argument against the possibility of a Causal Theory of Action, fails. But, I 
believe that his discussion of the verifiability argument, is still relevant to the 
question of whether reasons are causes, as opposed to the question of whether 
reasons can be causes. Its relevance becomes clear, if one sees it as a defence of 
the thesis that a non-causal theory such as his, captures best what is important 
and genuinely explanatory in our conceptual framework for explaining, 
understanding and predicting behaviour100. This way of looking at the problem
99 E&U, p.l 15
100 Of course, one could take the eliminativist position, and claim that there is very little 
worth retaining in our ordinary psychological, (including action) explanations; we should therefore 
place our confidence in the evolving science of neurophysiology and its completely different
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accords with C. Taylor’s position101, who argues that, we cannot decide on the 
correct theory on purely ‘a priori’ grounds: The correct theory can only be 
decided on its capacity to accommodate the concepts that are relevant to the 
explanation and prediction of action.
III.
Consider first the relevance of von Wright’s arguments to the Causal - 
Nomological Theory of Action. According to it, the explanation and prediction 
of action in terms of the agent’s intentional attitudes, implicitly assumes causal 
laws that link the latter with the former. Hempel’s insistence that a universal 
law, or law-sketch, should be included among the explanantia of any adequate 
explanation, is based on the contention that without any general statement, the 
explanation would not provide us with adequate grounds for expecting the event 
described in the explanandum to occur: If there is no universal hypothesis 
among the premises, then the D-N argument cannot carry through.
The practical syllogism, unlike Hempelean D-N arguments, contains as 
premises only singular propositions, which nevertheless suffice to make our 
expectation that the action will occur, a reasonable one. As von Wright’s 
discussion on the problem of verification has revealed, our concept of intention 
is such that, only from understanding the meaning of ‘A intends to bring about 
p ’ and ‘A believes that doing q is necessary for bringing about p’, we can expect 
that ‘A does q’ will be instantiated as true. Our expectation is based on the 
conceptual dependence between intention and belief on the one hand and action 
on the other, not on the belief that some causal law linking the two exists. It is 
true that having established that the agent has reasons to act in a certain way, 
and that the conditions allowing him to act prevail, we can often predict with
taxonomy, replacing little by little today’s ‘folk psychology’. This is surely a consistent position 
(taken by e.g. P. Churchland), but it is not one that is espoused by any of the defenders of the 
Causal Theories of Action which 1 am discussing here. These theories surely want to retain 
explanations in terms of reasons, as we ordinarily use them.
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confidence the agent’s behaviour. In that respect, it may be thought that our 
predictions resemble the ones made by natural scientists on the basis of causal 
laws. But as von Wright points out in one of his later works:
‘The only hypothetical elem ent involved in a prediction o f  this kind is that a  certain 
volitional and epistemic attitude o f  an agent will not change in the timespan allowed 
between the formation o f  the intention and the execution o f  the action. One could 
therefore also say that the prediction is that the agent will not change his mind, and not 
that he will act. This is so because o f  the conceptual, as distinct from the nomic, tie 
connecting the volitional-cognitive com plex with the action’ ,02.
The generalisations on which we sometimes base our predictions are 
therefore, statistical generalisations with no causal implications. The only ‘risk’ 
of empirical falsification that anyone asserting them takes, is that the agent will 
not retain his intention and belief until the moment of action. Hence, to construe 
the schema of practical inference as a law-sketch103, is to disregard a tenet of 
Hempel’s own theory of explanation: That the criterion of soundness of any 
explanation, is ‘exclusively whether it rests on empirically well confirmed 
assumptions concerning initial conditions and general laws.’104 As the 
verifiability argument shows, there can be no decisive, direct empirical 
confirmation of the premises or the conclusion of a P.I.; there is always some 
escape clause suggested by a different interpretation of the agent’s attitudes or 
behaviour, in view of the rest of our ascriptions, which are effected through the 
use of practical syllogisms. Hence, the power of these generalisations to group 
together types of intentions and beliefs with the appropriate behaviour, is based 
on relations of meaning and is always affected by considerations of further 
intentional attitudes and behaviour, as well as the context within which action 
takes place. Their conditions of application, in all interesting cases, cannot be 
fully specified in advance by using direct, (independently of the mediation of
101 See his [1964] book, Ch. 1.
102 Von Wright [1980], p.56.
103 As for example Churchland [1970] does.
104 See Hempel [1942], p. 240.
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contextual and intentional considerations), methods of verification. This is why 
they are statistical generalisations and not sketches of causal laws.
Von Wright’s position, as it emerges from his discussion of the verifiability 
argument, is not so far from Davidson’s with respect to his scepticism regarding 
laws expressible in intentional terms105. Davidson’s argument against the 
possibility of establishing strict causal laws in the science of Psychology, rests 
on his contention that explanations in terms of intentional attitudes are 
inescapably holistic, and committed to the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’. 
Von Wright’s arguments about the impossibility of independent verification of 
premises and conclusion of the P.I. schema make use of the same central idea: 
Any ascription of intention and intentional action must be mediated by 
ascriptions of further intentional attitudes and behaviour. This procedure, is for 
von Wright inextricably linked with the use of the practical syllogism, whereas 
for Davidson, it must ‘pay allegiance’ to the ideal of rationality that we must 
apply to persons, if we are to understand them as rational agents. Moreover, von 
Wright’s characterisation of the conceptual bond relating intentions and actions 
as ‘partly a condition of the intelligibility of the action, and partly a condition of 
the applicability of the concept of intention’, resonates Davidson’s contention 
that the ‘limit...placed on the social sciences is set not by nature, but by us when 
we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes.’106 Thus, for 
both philosophers, the procedure of assigning intentional attitudes must 
necessarily take into account the holistic relations of meaning that hold between 
them. A causal law that would be informative and explanatory, would then have 
to ‘allow us to determine in advance whether or not the conditions of
1051 hope that the preceding discussions o f both philosophers’ theories, will have made clear 
the enormous differences that still separate them in almost every other issue in the Philosophy of 
Action.
106 ‘Psychology as Philosophy’, EAE, p.239.
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application are satisfied’ 107.But because of the objections mentioned above and
108which both philosophers have raised, there can be no such law
However, there are philosophers109 that have argued that holism, as well as 
the allegiance to an ‘ideal’ principle can also be encountered in physical theories 
that can nevertheless, still formulate causal laws. They support their contention, 
by analogies, such as Newton’s Mechanics, or the principle of energy 
conservation. It seems to me though, that the analogy is not warranted. In the 
Physical Sciences, strict causal laws can be tested in interesting situations, 
because we can determine in advance whether or not they hold in our 
experimental set-up. And although we cannot build an ideal closed system, we 
can often approximate it very closely and experiment in it. In the study of 
human behaviour, we cannot even approximate any interesting closed system in 
practice. How can we ever be sure what are the determinants of an agent’s 
intentions and beliefs? If we are to test any interesting actions that resemble real 
life ones, there is no way that we can know what and how determines the 
agent’s volitional and cognitive attitudes. I think that the arguments by 
Davidson and von Wright which have already been presented, have made the 
possibility of establishing beforehand the conditions of application of such 
laws, look remote.
Hence, if the conditions in which the law holds are not specifiable in 
advance, then to insist, ‘ex post actu’, that some causal law that covered the case 
exists, seems to be an idle move, and can have no force as a defence of the 
Causal-Nomological Theory. As von Wright observes, ‘not the law itself, but 
the existence of a law is now a tautologous after-construction’.110
107 Ibid., p.233.
108 For a similar position on the affinity of von Wright’s and Davidson’s views on this matter, 
see Stoutland [1982], pp.60-62.
109 See, e.g. Churchland [1970] and Crane and Mellor [1990].
1,0 Von Wright [1981].
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IV.
The arguments advanced above against the Causal- Nomological Theory do 
not bear directly on Davidson’s Causal Theory, since he does not rest his causal 
condition on the nomic connection between intentional attitudes and behaviour. 
Does von Wright’s verifiability argument have any force against Davidson’s 
theory? It is difficult to argue against Davidson’s theory from the ‘intentionalist’ 
standpoint, since Davidson appears to accept all that is considered essential to 
action-explanations by von Wright; he agrees that the relation between reason 
and action is not simply empirical and that, as we have seen, there can be no 
more than statistical generalisations linking the two. So, most of his arguments 
are geared towards establishing the possibility of reasons being causes, rather 
than the necessity of this being so; his only argument in support of the view that 
the idea of cause must be included in the framework of action explanations, is 
that only causal explanation can give an adequate account of how the event 
described in the explanandum is brought about. As I have already tried to show, 
the thesis in favour of the possibility of a causal connection between reasons 
and causes, cannot be overturned by any version of the Logical Connection 
Argument, developed in the context of von Wright’s theory, or indeed in that of 
any ‘intentionalistic’ theory. Even if a strict entailment between premises and 
conclusion of the P.I. was established, it would not follow that reasons cannot 
be non-nomic causes. This is something that Davidson’s as well as Gean’s 
arguments have established.
As far as Davidson’s thesis that reasons must be causes is concerned, I think 
that von Wright’s verifiability argument can be used to undermine it, in the 
same way that Davidson’s own arguments in favour of the anomalism of the 
mental can be used to undermine the causal relevance of intentional attitudes in 
Davidsonian action-explanations. As I have argued in Part I, the causal 
condition in Davidson’s model of action-explanations does not help us to 
understand any better how an intentional action (rather than an event which 
happens to be an intentional action), was brought about. The causal condition is 
simply irrelevant to the explanatory adequacy of reasons, since no account can 
be given for the causal role played by the content of intentional attitudes in
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bringing about the action. Von Wright’s position is that the conceptual 
connection between reasons and actions suffices to account for the production 
of behaviour and that no restatement, in causal terms, of teleological action 
explanations, is needed. Thinking of reasons (or the onset of reasons) as 
separate occurrences in the agent’s brain that cause his bodily behaviour (which 
can thus be described as action), without being able to connect (directly or 
indirectly) the two events as described , via a causal law, does not help us 
understand, explain or predict the action any better. These three purposes are 
best accomplished by the P.I.-schema without the need of an additional causal 
clause. The only purpose accomplished by this addition (as effected in 
Davidson’s theory), is to help satisfy the prejudice of anyone who thinks that the 
relation of event causation must somehow underlie all phenomena that are 
subject to explanation and prediction. An implication of this line of thinking, is 
that no explanation can be adequate, if it does not mention the event-cause of 
the event described in the explanandum. This, I think is the causalist conviction 
that lies behind Davidson’s main argument in favour of the view that reasons 
must be causes. In the next chapter, I will examine the argument, and consider a 
possible response by von Wright.
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CHAPTER 6 : TWO CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY
The Problem o f Justification vs Explanation
Davidson’s main reason for holding that action must be analysed in terms of 
causes, is that only the causal condition can account for the explanatory, as 
distinct from justifying, force of reasons; in non-causal theories, the efficacy of 
reasons in producing the behaviour involved in the act is simply not there. Such 
theories, construe the relationship between the agent’s volitional and cognitive 
attitudes and his behaviour as a conceptual one, and hence can only provide 
rationalisations (which are for Davidson adequate only for justification), but not 
explanations of actions. This causalist charge is put succinctly by Mackie, when 
he says that in von Wright’s account ‘we have nothing but a set of interlocking 
concepts, with no shadow of an account or explanation of how A came to do 
B’.m To explain an action, we need to say, not only in what way it appealed to 
the agent, but also what brought it about, how it was produced.
Davidson brings out the significance of the causal factor, by producing the 
(consistent) hypothesis of agents holding more than one reason for the same 
action, but performing it because of only one of them. Without causation, he 
claims, we cannot distinguish between an agent’s acting because o f  a reason and 
his acting and merely having a reason. Consider the following example that 
illustrates the problem: Suppose that A wants both to let some air into the room, 
and to let a fly out, and he thinks that the means appropriate for each end, are to 
open the window. Imagine however, that he opens the window only because of 
his desire to air the room and not because of his desire to let the fly out. This 
does not mean that he is free from his desire to let the fly out, only that he does 
not act on it. When he acts, he desires both the cooling of the room and the fly 
to be out and therefore his action can be rationalised by both desires. But he
,n Mackie [1974], p.292.
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only acts because of the first one, the second desire merely ‘being there’, and so 
we can only explain his action by reference to the first one, not the second. 
Now, this kind of case is conceivable, if not actual, and is produced by 
Davidson in order to show that, without the concept of the cause, we cannot 
distinguish explanation from justification.
I have argued in Part I, that the causal condition, as construed by Davidson, 
does not give us any help in understanding the efficacy of reasons. Here, I want 
to examine what kind of response can be given by von Wright, independently of 
the arguments raised against Davidson.
Von Wright’s construal of this kind of cases is completely different from the 
causal theorist’s and is capable, I believe, of meeting Davidson’s charge of 
explanatory inadequacy. In von Wright’s theoiy, the relation between reason 
and action is construed in a way that does not allow for Davidson’s criticism to 
even be raised. Consider the example given above, seen after the action has 
been performed, when we seek an explanation of A’s opening of the window. 
Saying that A’s behaviour was performed in accordance with a particular 
intention (e.g. to let in some air), means that this intention was the reason for  
which A acted as he did. If A also possessed an intention to let a fly out which
119remained inert in that case , then this was not the reason for which he acted, 
because it was not the ‘ousting’ of the fly which was intended by A’s opening of 
the window. In other words, von Wright’s model for the explanation of action, 
requires that the intention which is given in the explanation of the action, is the
112My reference to an ‘inert’ intention in the context of von Wright’s theory, requires 
qualification, since Von Wright differentiates between intentions for immediate action and 
intentions for action in the future. He denies that an agent can have an intention to act now which 
remains inert in the above sense: It is a contradiction to say that A intended to p and thought q’ing 
right then necessaiy for p, but he q’ed for a different reason. However, he allows for a case where A 
intended to p and thought q necessaiy for p (but not at that particular instant), and the intention to p 
remained inactive until he q’ed for a different reason. (See von Wright [1980], p. 59) It is this kind 
o f cases that my defence of von Wright’s theory concerns, and it seems to be the only kind which 
could instantiate the causalists’ imaginary examples. Whether von Wright is right in holding that the 
first kind of cases are not logically possible, is a complex issue which I will not examine here. For a 
similar to von Wright view, see Ginet [1990], p. 145.
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intention with which the agent acted. Therefore, when we explain an action 
within this model by stating the agent’s intention and belief, we are giving its 
determinants, i.e. the reasons for which the agent acted, not some rationalising 
attitudes that he simply possessed. An explanation based on the P.I. schema, is 
explanation in terms of these reasons; if not, then it is simply a wrong 
explanation, based on a fallacious understanding of the intention which was 
involved in the action.
Davidson contends that the idea of acting for a reason is obscure unless we 
understand it as implying the presence of a causal connection between reason 
and action113; the only plausible genuinely explanatory relation between the two, 
is the causal one. But as we have seen, if we include the causal condition in the 
explanation of action in the way that Davidson suggests, we lose the explanatory 
relation between the content of the reason and the action. In von Wright’s 
theory, the explanatory relation is solely the conceptual connection, while the 
notion of agency cannot be analysed any further. The fact that there are agents 
that intentionally bring about events in the world is as basic, for him, as the fact 
that there are events that causally necessitate the occurrence of other events. I 
will not go into this dispute here, since I think that persuasive arguments for 
either view, can be given only from the standpoint of a comprehensive theory of 
one or the other kind. All I want to argue here is that, if the notion of agency is 
accepted, then the distinction between acting with a certain intention and acting 
and merely having this intention, can be sustained in von Wright’s theory.
So, what about the objection raised by the causalists, i.e. that von Wright’s 
theory cannot distinguish between the intention with which the agent acts, and 
the intention that he merely possesses, but remains inert? I believe that this 
objection is unwarranted. If by distinguishing between intentions (or, for that 
matter, desires and other intentional attitudes), the causalist means locating an 
antecedent state, or event that somehow (causally or otherwise) brings about the 
behaviour in the act, then he is misconstruing von Wright’s theory. The theory
1,3 See e.g. ARC, in EAE, p.9.
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cannot provide conditions for locating intentional attitudes construed as above, 
since, by its nature, it does not accept the event-causal analysis of action.
But, if the issue is not prejudged by formulating the problem in event-causal 
terms, then von Wright’s theory can indeed allow for conditions of 
distinguishing between the intention with which one acts, and the intention that 
stays ‘inactive’. These conditions will certainly not distinguish between a 
certain antecedent event that motivates the behaviour and another one that does 
not. The conditions for the correct ascription of the motivating intention 
‘behind’ behaviour will involve appeal to what the agent aimed at, or meant, by 
his behaviour. To determine that, we will have to look at the agent’s character, 
his future and past behaviour, the particular circumstances, and so on. For 
example, if A opened the window with the intention of airing the room and not 
with the intention of letting the fly out, we could probably determine that by 
looking at his subsequent behaviour, (e.g. he may breathe with a sigh of relief 
when the window is opened while showing no interest in the presence of the 
fly.) So, these conditions will be based on the complex considerations of context 
and ascription of intentional attitudes, discussed by von Wright in his 
verifiability argument, which show whether the agent intended by his behaviour 
to achieve one end or another. These considerations are bound to be fallible, but 
no more so than any consideration pertaining to ascriptions of intentionality.
The Problem o f Congruence
In view of the above considerations, I conclude that the charge made by 
Davidson against non-causal theories, that they cannot distinguish between 
explanation and justification of action is, at least for von Wright’s theory, 
ungrounded. However, if the argument is understood as an attempt to show that 
the theory cannot explain how ‘mere behaviour’, i.e. the bodily movements 
involved in the act, come about, then it has some force and must be considered 
on a different basis. Von Wright’s theory says nothing about the question of
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how ‘mere’ behaviour is produced. His P.I. schema, is a schema for the 
explanation of action, not bodily movements, and thus when a piece of 
behaviour is explained according to it, it is explained as an action, there being 
no direct implications about how the muscular activity involved was produced. 
In Davidson’s theory, on the other hand, actions just are bodily movements with 
the right sort of causes. It is therefore easy, when contrasting the two theories, to 
equivocate the question of how ‘mere behaviour ’ is produced with the 
completely different, for von Wright, question of how intentional behaviour is 
produced. This equivocation, which von Wright does not accept, gives an initial 
plausibility to the causalists’ claim that von Wright can not explain how actions 
come about. This claim is, as I have argued, false. Nevertheless, the question of 
how ‘mere behaviour’ is produced, remains unanswered in his theory, hence 
raising for him as well the problem of congruence. In this section, I will 
examine in exactly what the problem consists for von Wright, and try to show 
that it is a real one for his theory.
I.
The main thrust behind the Causal Theory of Action is that it promises to 
bridge the chasm that seems to exist between the category of agency which is 
central to our understanding of phenomena that involve human interference, and 
the category of event causation which is supposed to be the basis of our 
understanding of the physical world, the ‘cement of the universe’, as it was 
called by Hume. The reconciliation of human agency with the naturalist 
perspective is supposedly achieved by the C.T.A. through an analysis of action 
that identifies the causes of behaviour, with the mental attitudes that rationalise 
it. Hence, the only dependence relation that is presupposed is the relation of 
event causation, and the only type of explanation used is causal explanation; 
intentional action is thus analysed into categories well-recognised by the 
physical sciences.
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As I have argued in Part I, Davidson’s theory does not succeed in giving a 
satisfactory account of how this reconciliation is made possible. The physical 
language, which contains the predicates featuring in the causal law that grounds 
the explanatory causal connection, is radically detached from the psychological 
language which contains the mental predicates that rationalise the action. This 
detachment does not let us have any explanation of the relevance of the content 
of our intentional attitudes to the occurrence of a certain type of events, which 
are called actions, in the real world.
On the other hand, the Causal-Nomological theory of action does not seem to 
face this kind of problem. Reasons are nomically tied to their effects and 
therefore, the causation of behaviour is subsumed under a full-blown causal law 
that connects mental attitudes qua mental with behaviour. So, the answer given 
by this type of theories to the question why did a particular mental attitude cause 
a particular piece of behaviour, is because a causal law covered this case. The 
fact that the existence of a causal law connecting reasons and actions, so 
described, is asserted, is sufficient to justify our choice of describing the relata 
of the singular causal relation in that way; our need to view content as playing 
an efficient role in the production of action, is satisfied. The further question of 
how these mental properties can be instantiated in, or reduced to, physical ones, 
belongs to the domain of the mind/body problem and does not affect the 
integrity of the causal-nomological explanation of action. However, powerful 
arguments have been developed against the causal-nomological theory by 
causalists and non-causalists alike so that the theory is shown to be at odds with 
the way we use our intentional concepts. The Causal-Nomological theory, for 
that reason, cannot be considered as providing a plausible account of intentional 
action, despite the fact that it appears to deal with the problem of congruence in 
a satisfactory way.
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II.
Von Wright’s theory can also been criticised114 on the grounds that it fails to 
provide an explanation for the congruence between action and the bodily 
movements that are necessary for the accomplishment of its result. Our demand 
here, is for an explanation of the fact that my action of q-ing, which is not to be 
analysed in event-causal terms, is regularly accompanied by an event in the 
world which is intrinsic to my action, and which is obviously the effect of some 
neurophysiological cause. In the case of (productive) basic actions, this event is 
some bodily movement. Now, in causal theories, the cause equals the reason, 
and the effect equals the action. In his theory, von Wright has constructed a 
schema for the explanation and understanding of intentional action, but he has 
not provided an account in the same terms for the occurrence of these bodily 
movements (or, in general, of the events) that are necessary for such actions. 
Hence, the question naturally arises: How can we explain the fact that, 
whenever I act intentionally, the event which is intrinsic to my action occurs as 
an effect of some (sufficient) causal condition?
III.
At a first level, Von Wright tries to meet this objection by denying the need 
for an explanation. The explanandum of a teleological-intentionalist explanation 
is different from that of a causal explanation. To explain causally a piece of 
behaviour, is to give sufficient causal conditions for the occurrence of some 
bodily movements. This will presumably involve a description of a 
neurophysiological structure involved, as well as the ‘triggering’ neural events 
that produce the movements. But, no matter how detailed the explanation is, it 
will necessarily refer to the movement of the agent’s body, not to the agent’s
1,4 See Stoutland [1982], [1984].
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movement of his body. Hence, the explanandum of a causal explanation of 
behaviour must be a physical event that makes no mention, implicit or explicit, 
to agency.
On the other hand, the explanandum of a teleological-intentional explanation 
of behaviour, is an action. According to von Wright, a P.I. cannot be applied to 
explain behaviour without having first placed an intentional interpretation on it. 
To identify and describe appropriately an explanandum, one has to first 
understand it as intentional action: ‘In order to be teleologically
explicable....behaviour must first be intentionalistically understood115. In the 
process of picking out the descriptum which we need to describe and have 
explained, it is not our observation of physical movements ‘stripped’ from 
intentionality which matters, but our ‘intentionalistic’ understanding of the 
behaviour as action. This is evident especially in actions that involve a 
multitude of complex and disparate movements which can be grouped together 
and subjected to explanation, only in virtue of their being movements that 
constitute a such and such intentional action. Hence, to describe in the 
appropriate way and consider as an explanandum an action such as enrolling on 
a three year course of Biology, say, we first have to understand the great variety 
of movements involved as being intentional; no considerations of their physical 
aspect will help us. Once we have identified and described our action- 
explanandum, its physical aspect is immaterial for the purposes of the 
teleological explanation.
It is Von Wright’s contention that when we observe an action, we do not 
observe movements of the body and then place on them an intentionalistic 
understanding. The two forms of description are rather two different ways of 
understanding something (behaviour) which is initially neutral. The physical 
form of description involves grasping what behaviour is like in certain physical 
respects, whereas the intentional form of description involves grasping the 
meaning of behaviour. In both cases, understanding in one way or another takes 
place before explanation can take off: ‘Understanding is a prerequisite of every
1,5 E&U, p. 121.
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explanation, whether causal or teleological’116. The ‘reading off of actions from 
behaviour is as direct as the observation of physical movements of the body, and 
in the case of action-explanations, it is this kind of understanding that matters. 
Von Wright thinks that it is false to believe that our understanding of action 
involves the placing of a certain interpretation on bodily movements. What we 
see is a person raising her arm, not a person’s arm rising which we then 
interpret as her raising of her arm.
Therefore, it is a mistake, according to von Wright, to think that the 
behaviour in the act is ‘mere behaviour’ (i.e. physically described), which is 
given an intentionalist interpretation. If this is so, then no explanation can be 
asked for the fact that the behaviour in the act occurs congruently with the 
action. For the behaviour in the act is not bodily movement but intentional 
behaviour, and as such, it cannot have a causal explanation at all. Once we have 
a physical description of behaviour, a causal explanation is possible; likewise a 
teleological explanation is possible when we start with an intentionalistic 
description. But since the latter does not contain in any sense the physical 
description as its basic constituent, the question of how the behaviour involved 
in the action can also have a causal explanation is illegitimate: These are 
explanations of two different things.
IV.
But this way of denying the need for an explanation of the congruence 
between bodily movements and action, will not satisfy us when we inquire 
about the congruence between actions and their results. The result of an action is 
an event (a ‘change in the world’) which, being an intrinsic part of the action, its 
occurrence is explained through the intentional-teleological explanation: It is a 
change in the world brought about by the agent for some particular reason. But 
it cannot be disputed (except perhaps by agent-causalists) that this change is 
also the end-effect of some event-causal sequence that (presumably) begins in
1,6 E&U, p. 135.
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the agent’s brain and, after proceeding through her nervous system and muscles, 
produces the result of the action. That this event can have two different types of 
explanation, is something that von Wright has to accept, if his theory is not to 
defy well-established scientific facts. His task must then be to show that the two 
types of explanation are compatible, and furthermore, that any demand to the 
effect that they be somehow connected, is illegitimate.
Von Wright approaches the problem by considering the counterfactual
117element involved in action. He imagines a case where the result of an action 
would have materialised independently of the agent, and asks whether in such a 
case we would deny that the agent_had really performed an action. For example, 
we are invited to imagine her opening intentionally a door by turning the handle 
and pushing, while at the same time, unknown to the agent, there is a causal 
mechanism operating and opening the door just at the time that she is pushing. 
In that case, von Wright says that we should deny that the agent opened the door 
since, the result of this disputed action was not brought about by the agent but 
by an independent cause operating without her knowledge. So, the 
counterfactual statement, ‘The result would not have materialised, had she not 
performed the action’, is false, forcing us to retract our original ascription of 
intentionality to the agent’s behaviour. Still, we could redescribe her behaviour 
as an act of ‘trying to open the door’ and this would impute intentionality to it, 
even if it would be only ‘mutilated’ intentionality.
However, in the case of basic actions no such redescription is possible, since 
basic actions are not performed by doing something else. If I fail to raise my 
arm (as a basic action) I cannot be said to have tried but failed to raise it: I either 
can raise my arm, or I can’t. So, if  we imagine a causal mechanism of the sort 
envisaged in the previous example, operating independently of the agent 
whenever she raises her arm, then we cannot redescribe her action as a trying to 
raise her arm. If we are to deny that she raised her arm, then we cannot impute 
on her behaviour a ‘mutilated’ aspect of intentionality, because if she did not 
raise her arm, then she did nothing.
1,7 This discussion is found in E&U, p. 125 ff.
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But, according to von Wright, the fact that the counterfactual ‘if the agent 
had not raised her arm, then the arm would not have risen’ is false, should not 
lead us to deny the intentionality of such basic actions. He thinks that the result 
o f a basic action, (e.g. the arm’s rising) can have a Humean event-cause that 
nomically necessitates it, and still be the result of an action, i.e. its intrinsic 
event that is brought about intentionally. The occurrence of the event-result can 
thus be explained both by subsuming it under causal laws, and teleologically, as 
the intrinsic event of an intentional action. This defence of compatibilism, 
amounts to denying that the kind of objective counterfactual element involved 
in non-basic actions, is also present in basic actions. So, to say that the result of 
the basic action would have occurred independently of the agent’s intentionally 
bringing it about, does not imply that the agent did not perform an intentional 
basic action. However, von Wright still retains the counterfactual element for 
basic actions, but only in a subjective sense. ‘The element of counterfactuality’ 
he writes, ‘consists in that the agent confidently thinks that certain changes will
liftnot occur unless he acts’. So, if the agent believes that certain causes operate 
independently of him, and he just observes them producing results such as 
risings of his arm, then he necessarily does not act. This is so because to observe 
a cause operating, implies that you stay passive: ‘When I observe, I let things 
happen. When I act, I make things happen’.119
I think that von Wright’s way of arguing for the compatibility of the two 
types of explanation is not convincing: He does not make clear what is the 
relevant difference between the example of the non-basic action and that of the 
basic action, that leads him to deny the intentionality of the first one, while
1 JOaffirming the intentionality of the second . As a consequence, his denial of the 
objective counterfactual element in basic actions, looks artificial as a solution to 
his problem.
1.8 E&U, p. 130, fh.39.
1.9 ibid., p. 130.
120 Perhaps he means to treat the first case as a case of pre-emption, and the second one as a 
case of overdetermination; but this is not made clear in his discussion of the examples. Moreover,
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Nevertheless, I believe that von Wright’s theory indeed allows for the two 
different types of explanation being compatible in the case of basic actions. To 
see that, we need to specify a criterion for the incompatibility of different 
explanations, such as Kim’s general principle of explanatory exclusion, which 
states that, ‘two or more complete and independent explanations of the same 
event cannot coexist.’121In the problem that we are considering, we have two 
explanations of the same event (the result of the action), which are indeed 
independent (since von Wright does not allow for any connection between the 
two), but not both of them are complete. The causal explanation of the rising of 
A’s arm is complete since, we are assuming, there must be antecedent sufficient 
conditions for its occurrence, in terms of some neurophysiological events and 
mechanism. However, the explanation of the same event in terms of A’s 
intentional attitudes, is not complete, since von Wright’s schema is a schema for 
the explanation of actions, not of the results o f actions. So, when we explain 
A’s arm-raising by citing her relevant intention and belief, we are explaining the 
result of her action only indirectly, since our explanandum is an instance of a 
relation that holds between A and the rising of her arm. Therefore, even if we 
consider the explanation of the action as complete, the explanation of its result 
need not be complete. We can see that it is not complete in the sense that the 
causal explanation is, if we notice that the occurrence of this particular arm- 
rising is not necessitated by A’s attitudes, as it is necessitated by its sufficient 
causal conditions: There is no direct reference to any particular arm rising in the 
intention or the belief cited in the explanation.122 The teleological explanation
this would be a misleading way to characterise the situation, since in the case o f the basic action, the 
result is not caused by the agent.
121 See Kim [1989], p.89. (My emphasis). Kim restricts the use of his principle to causal 
explanations, but then he goes on to apply it to Malcolm’s model of action-explanations (see 
Malcolm [1968]) which is, according to Malcolm, irreducibly teleological. The source o f the 
confusion is the fact that Malcolm uses the word ‘cause’ not in the Humean sense, but in its widest 
sense, meaning ‘anything that explains or partly explains the occurrence of some behaviour.’ (ibid., 
p.59) In that sense, von Wright’s explanantia, can also be called causes of behaviour, and hence the 
principle can be applied to explanations in terms of them.
122 For a way in which (concurrent) intentions, involving direct reference to their object (i.e. 
the action), can be construed, see Ginet [1990], p.l36ff.
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is, however, a complete explanation of the action, i.e. of A ’s bringing it about 
that her arm rises. Its completeness does not, of course, consist in the fact that 
A’s attitudes nomically necessitate the action, but in the conceptual connection 
that holds between the two. Hence, I conclude, the teleological, indirect 
explanation of the result of a basic action, is compatible with a complete causal
123explanation of the same event .
V.
The arguments presented above, establish the compatibility of the two types 
of explanation, but they do not yet solve the problem of congruence. There is an 
inherent instability in a situation where we have, for the same event, two 
compatible explanations which are supposed to hold in virtue of two different 
explanatory relations. In our case, we have a teleological, incomplete 
explanation of the event in question, which, according to von Wright, holds in 
virtue of a relation between the agent and the result of her action, the relation of 
bringing about. This relation neither is, nor can be analysed in terms of, the 
causal relation. For von Wright, it is just part of the way the world is, that there 
are agents who bring about changes in the world. On the other hand, we also 
have a causal explanation of the result of the action which, we believe, is 
grounded on a causal connection between a neural event and the result itself. 
Explanatory realism requires that this causal connection is objective, i.e. that its 
instantiation is independent of our explanations in terms of it.124 For anyone 
who wants to view the possibility of there being agents that intentionally bring 
about events in the world, as a real one, there is a question that needs to be
123 Of course the conclusion holds only with respect to Kim’s principle o f explanatory 
exclusion (which gives us only a sufficient condition for rendering two explanations incompatible), 
but I think that the principle captures what, intuitively, seems to be the source of the problem here: 
That there appear to be two independent, complete explanations for the same event.
,24With respect to the ‘objectivity’ o f the causal explanatory relation, I am here using Kim’s 
idea o f explanatory realism (see Kim [1987] and [1989]). With respect to the relation of ‘bringing 
about’, 1 do not think that we can call it objective in the same sense; it suffices I think to say that 
von Wright considers it an irreducible relation.
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answered here: How can it be the case that, whenever I perform an action by 
making it true that a certain change in the world is effected, that very change is 
also causally necessitated by some antecedent neural event? There is a 
congruence between my bringing about of certain events, and nature’s causal 
mechanism that produces the same particular events, and this congruence seems 
surprising. Not to von Wright though. For him, the fact that the two different 
types of explanation may both be valid on every particular occasion, is a 
contingent fact; it is just part of the way the world is, and thus defies any 
explanation:
‘That this requirem ent is met, is a contingency. But it is nothing to be surprised at. 
For, it is a condition which the world must satisfy, if  we are to entertain our present 
notions o f  action and agency.’ 125
So, his response with respect to the challenge to account for the congruence 
between action and event-causation, is to deny the legitimacy of questions 
demanding that an explanation should be given. Such an argument is presented 
in his Causality and Determinism.126 There, it is argued that for the 
establishment of each type of connection, there are sufficient conditions, and 
these two sets of conditions are independent of each other. Consider the case of 
an agent getting up from a chair as a basic action. If we want to establish that 
the agent brought about the event involved (that his body got up from the chair) 
as a result of a basic action, we have to make enquiries about his intentions, 
abilities, awareness of the situation, etc. The existence of an independent cause 
will be established on the basis of a completely different form of enquiry, an 
enquiry into the physiological state of the agent. But these two types of enquiry 
are independent of each other (at least when the agent has the physical ability to 
perform the action) and so, there cannot be any influence of the conclusion of 
the one on the conclusion of the other. Even if we establish that a sufficient 
cause for the lifting up of the man from the chair was operating, we could still 
maintain that the agent really got up from the chair intentionally, provided of 
course that such a conclusion is suggested by our investigation into his
125 von Wright [1974], p. 132.
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intentions, beliefs, abilities, etc. The two forms of enquiry are therefore 
compatible but also detached, so that no explanation for their congruence can be 
given.
If we attempted frequently to perform a certain type of action without its 
result materialising, or if the event constituting its result occurred 
unintentionally (e.g. unintentional arm-risings), on many occasions, then we 
would lose confidence in our ability to perform this particular type of action. 
And if these discrepancies between ‘mere behaviour’ and action occurred for all 
types of action, then we would probably give up the concept of intentional 
action altogether.
‘The events which are the results o f  basic actions thus happen, on the whole, only 
when we «vest» these events with intentionality, i.e. perform the basic actions. That 
this should be so is an empirical fact, but a fact which is fundamental to the concept o f  
an action. The conceptual basis o f  action, one could therefore say, is partly our 
ignorance (unawareness) o f  the operation o f  causes and partly our confidence that 
certain changes will happen only when we happen to be acting.’127
It seems to me that von Wright’s response is a poor one, for the same reasons 
that Davidson’s rejection of the need for explanation of the congruence is 
unsatisfactory. The fact that a necessary constituent of my basic actions, their 
intrinsic result, occurs as an effect of some event-cause, whenever I 
intentionally bring it about, is indeed something that must be explained by a 
theory that purports to provide a complete account of action. The problem is, 
that this event is a necessary part of the action itself: There cannot be an arm- 
raising without an arm-rising. So, if the agent’s bringing about of this event, 
remains detached from the type of connection that is justifiably considered as 
the most appropriate explanatory connection for its type, i.e. the causal 
connection, then it must be the role of the ‘actionist’ relation that is brought 
under suspicion. Our intuition is more inclined to lead us to question the 
explanatory role of intentionality in the ‘production’ of physical events, than to
126 ibid., p. 132.
127 E&U, p. 130.
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accept that it is a mystery how brain events, congruently with agents, bring 
about the results of their actions. Therefore, if we were to accept von Wright’s 
contention that the role of event-causation is independent from that of the agent 
in bringing about these events, then we would be drawn towards a non-realist 
understanding of intentional explanations.
My aim is not to question von Wright’s metaphysical assumptions, which 
include an ‘actionist’ understanding of causation, but to argue that his theory, 
like Davidson’s, cannot provide explanations of action which are complete, in 
the sense of answering all genuine questions which concern the relevant, for the 
purposes of explanation, aspects of action. The question of the occurrence of the 
result is a relevant question, since it concerns a logically intrinsic part of action. 
His admittance that physical causation may be at work here, puts us in a 
predicament of wondering at the fact that two types of relation, which are 
radically detached, are both responsible for the occurrence of one and the same 
event. As he, himself says, ‘wonder of this type can be both the starting point
Iand the end station of philosophical inquiry’. For his theory’s sake, I hope it’s 
not the latter.
128 See his reply to Stoutland, von Wright [1984], p.809.
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